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Paying Back Your Country Through
Income-Contingent Student Loans
EVELYN BRODY*
Governmental subsidies to higher education raise issues of fair-
ness between families and between generations. The recent partial
conversion of the federal guaranteed student loan program into a
program of direct governmental lending permits a graduate to pay
back the loan with a modest percentage of future income. This
income-contingent repayment option provides most graduates with
the only insurance they need against a poor job market. Thus, the
new legislation needlessly retains existing federal subsidies, which
could be more effectively targeted to the needy.
All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;
They have their exits and their entrances,
And one man in his time plays many parts,
His acts being seven ages.'
Then, in just seven sentences, Shakespeare takes us from mewling
infancy to the whining schoolboy, the sighing lover, the brave soldier,
and the wise justice, before concluding with shrunken old age and
second childhood and oblivion. Such an abbreviated recital must nec-
essarily omit a bit player who creeps step by step alongside each
actor - sometimes giving, sometimes taking - ensuring that at
each age the players remember their bonds with one another. This is,
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1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT act 2, sc. 7.
of course, the government. Unfortunately, these days we employ less
poetic, more business-like terms. The Seven Ages of Man has be-
come the "life cycle." Economists call the financial arrangement be-
tween citizens and government "public finance."
But just as each man and woman over time plays many parts, so
too does the public finance system. The government performs not
just tax collection, but also makes transfer payments (those dreaded
"entitlements ' 2) as well as incurs direct expenditures. From the cra-
dle to the grave, tax and other collective finance policies aid or hin-
der our major personal decisions.3 When we are young and when we
are old the government makes net transfers to us - think public
schools; think Social Security and Medicare. In between, while we
might benefit economically from some governmental programs, most
of us make net transfers to the government. And while our individual
lives course the seven ages, our society as a whole must be self-con-
tained. Where the government gives more than it takes, the deficit
spending creates a ripple effect sideways to contemporaneous capital
markets and, if the current generation fails to invest these transfer
payments in physical or human capital, downstream to future
generations.
Whenever society collects ("taxes") and provides ("spends"), it
creates redistributional effects. Often the decisions about how to tax
and how to spend have no necessary relationship with each other.
We might, for example, decide on a progressive income tax as a
mechanism to finance a navy that protects all residents equally.
Much governmental activity is not, however, aimed at providing
these types of public goods. Some governmental programs, such as
welfare programs, deliberately seek to transfer resources from the
rich to the poor. Commonly, policies largely make winners and losers
out of people in the same economic stratum, such as public elemen-
tary and secondary schools financed from local property taxes. Aside
from whether redistributional public spending is efficient (a matter
of positive economics), government redistribution of wealth from
poor to rich, or even from one middle-class citizen to another, is
often perceived as not being fair (a matter of normative economics).
But even if we agree that we wish to transfer resources in a certain
way, it is often difficult to figure out the distributional consequences
2. "Entitlements truly are the third rail of politics." Michael Arndt & Elaine S.
Povich, Budget Package "Cuts" Are Deceptive, CHI. TRIB., June 18, 1993, § 1, at 6
(explaining that "Medicare and Social Security . . . programs, which now consume 53
percent of the entire federal budget, have broad and powerful constituencies").
3. Professor David Bradford defends using the tax code as a mechanism to carry
out social programs because such a large percentage of the population must already
make an annual filing. "Perhaps we would view April 15 differently if we called it the
'annual unified individual tax and subsidy' filing date." DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTAN-
GLING THE INCOME TAX 270 (1986).
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of a particular program.
For example, to ensure the development of human capital, such as
education, most private citizens do not really need outright govern-
mental subsidies.4 That is, children and healthy and educated citi-
zens are not in themselves public goods, because the benefits to the
parents or to educated or healthy people outweigh the costs to those
individuals.5 Yet as individuals we often find ourselves constrained
from making optimal expenditures on children, education, and
health care. This is generally because the expenditure arises before
we have earned the income to pay for it. Although it is well recog-
nized that lifetime expenditure requirements follow a more level
curve than does our income stream, the private market will not gen-
erally lend against future earnings.' Thus, in many of these cases the
proper role of the government might be to remedy "market failure"
- to facilitate loans for investments in human capital.
This article focuses on the college student, who incurs expenses
that he or she probably only vaguely associates with an economic
payoff. Who should bear the burden of these costs? Some argue that
society as a whole should pay, because democracy is strengthened
when all can reach their intellectual potential. Others argue that the
family should pay, because the family can "capture" the financial
rewards. Even those who would impose the cost on the family debate
over which generation should pay: the parents, because their parents
put them through school, or the student, because the human capital
investment will produce an ample income stream to satisfy the costs.
4. This article does not explore how differing constituencies obtain government
benefits at the expense of other groups. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice
and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legisla-
tion in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1990).
5. See, e.g., William H. Oakland, Theory of Public Goods, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC ECONoMics 485, 498-99 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987) (dis-
tinguishing "public goods," which no one can consume to the exclusion of others' enjoy-
ment, from "externality goods," which individuals generally have an incentive to provide
from their own resources because they can consume a significant portion of the total
benefits from consumption).
6. Compare, e.g., Stephen P. Zeldes, Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An
Empirical Investigation, 97 J. POL. ECON. 305 (1989) (suggesting that an inability to
borrow against future income constrains the consumption of a significant portion of the
population) with Janet S. Hansen, STUDENT LOANS: ARE THEY OVERBURDENING A GEN-
ERATION? 33 (1986) (research report prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of the
U.S. Congress, on file with author) (because of unsecured credit cards, "borrowers ap-
peared to be able to obtain 'huge' amounts of consumer credit; their own self-imposed
limits were responsible for keeping debt levels generally below maximum levels estab-
lished by the marketplace"). With its generally high interest rates, credit card debt is
suitable only for short-term expenditures. See infra text accompanying note 167.
Finally, many agree that as a matter of fairness society should con-
tinue to bear costs for financially needy students. How - or when
- do we separate those deserving of outright grants from those who
just need a loan? In short, how much of higher education should
society pay for, and how well can it target the desired subsidies?
The first part of this article lays the framework for analyzing
when an individual needs a handout and when he or she merely
needs a hand to obtain a college education. We begin by separating
"public" from "private" goods; focusing on who benefits from higher
education, we see that a college education is clearly profitable for the
family even without government subsidy. Interfamily equity, then,
generally argues for making each family responsible for the educa-
tion of its own members.
Turning next to intergenerational fairness, we learn that one can-
not assume simply by looking at who makes the nominal tuition pay-
ment or loan repayment (or who nominally receives income) that a
particular family member or generation bears the financial burden of
an educational expenditure (or enjoys the benefit of an enhanced in-
come stream). Thus, we can neither hope to "impose" financial costs
on either parent or child, nor deprive one or the other of the financial
rewards of an education, because the members can make compensat-
ing intrafamily transfers. The same is true within society as a whole,
as the debate over deficit financing attests, thus questioning whether
a shift in education aid from a program of grants to a program of
loans effectively shifts costs from the current taxpaying generations
to later ones.
Next we focus on determining a particular student's (or family's)
financial well-being, which we need to know in order to assess wor-
thiness for any governmental subsidies we wish to provide. Because
the government routinely measures its citizens' resources on April
15, this determination begins with tax policy. We discover, however,
that our tax rules often arbitrarily distinguish between the resources
of one individual (such as the child) and the resources of a broader
economic unit (such as the family). Moreover, we see that the re-
sources of the same person change as she moves through her life
cycle of income and consumption. Specifically, income tends to rise
with age, peaking in middle age before falling off after retirement,
but consumption tends to be more level. Thus a person can look fi-
nancially deserving when young regardless of whether over her life-
time she turns out to be quite financially comfortable.
We conclude Part I with a review of the economic basis for the
current tax rules applicable to investments in education. As academ-
ics have long complained, to the extent higher education can be
shown to generate profits rather than to supply personal consump-
tion, we actually overtax college costs compared with other business
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investments by denying any cost recovery and interest deductions for
these expenditures. Moreover, using the tax system alone to effect
transfers is overly generous to some individuals and less than helpful
to others. "Tax expenditures" in the form of deductions (Stanley
Surrey's "upside-down" subsidies) provide the most value to those in
the highest tax brackets, who surely need help the least.7 Yet, we do
not have a negative income tax, and so a tax subsidy (whether in the
form of a deduction or a credit) provides no cash benefit greater
than the individual's current tax liability."
Accordingly, the second part of the article turns to a specific gov-
ernmental program for making uniform resources available to all
college students, with the least effective redistribution: loans. The
student loan program appears to be precisely the governmental tool
we seek - it operates not as a transfer program but as a mechanism
to smooth life cycle investment in a generally profitable activity for
which the private sector nevertheless will not freely lend. The federal
government has offered student loans in some form since Sputnik,
and guaranteed student loans currently represent the largest federal
aid program for higher education. The federal government uses a
student's, and her family's, financial status in pegging varying levels
of interest subsidies to borrowers (in addition to conducting its dwin-
dling needs-based grant program). In the Omnibus Budget Reconcil-
iation Act of 1993 ("OBRA 1993")" Congress enacted President
Clinton's student loan reform package, which includes a feature that
permits graduates to repay their debt out of a modest percentage of
future income.10
With the framework we established in the first part of this article,
we see that the federal student loan program makes a good start in
facilitating college attendance. However, if you believe as a norma-
tive matter, as I do, that we should transfer resources to those at the
7. STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 71-82
(1985).
8. The only refundable tax credit is the earned income tax credit ("EITC") for
low-income working parents. I.R.C. § 32 (West Supp. 1994). [Unless otherwise indi-
cated, all statutory citations are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended 26
U.S.C.A. §§ 1-9722 (West 1988-1989 & Supp. 1994).] Congress recently extended the
EITC, in reduced form, to childless workers between the ages of 25 and 65. I.R.C.
§ 32(c)(1)(A)(ii), amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L.
103-66, § 13131(b), 107 Stat. 312, 434 (1993) [hereinafter OBRA 1993].
9. OBRA 1993, supra note 8, Title IV.
10. I conclude Part II with discussions of the administrative issues raised by con-
verting the current guaranteed student loan program to one of direct federal lending, and
by proposals to have the Internal Revenue Service participate in collecting loans repaid
under the income-contingent method.
bottom of society's economic distribution, but not to those at the
middle or upper levels, then our current backwards-looking financial
aid tests, based on the resources of the student and his parents, un-
derstates the ability of the family to bear the costs of a college edu-
cation. A snapshot analysis of financial need causes us to
oversubsidize those who have simply not started their own routine
lifetime climb to financial security. Needs-based grants and loan
subsidies lump together those who are chronically needy with those
who seem needy only because of their current position on the life
cycle.
President Clinton's reform package leaves in place all the interest
rate subsidies for borrowers that existed in prior law. Moreover, in
contrast to Yale University's income-contingent loan experiment in
the 1970's, Clinton's program is not "mutualized." Accordingly, tax-
payers in general rather than other borrowers subsidize a particular
debtor electing income-contingent repayment who chooses a career
that will not be (or turns out not to be) financially profitable. How-
ever, this very option of income-contingent repayment suggests that
it would not necessarily be unfair to impose an unsubsidized loan on
a currently low-income young college graduate. That is, we could
(and I believe should) charge market interest rates" to all but those
most disadvantaged, because income-contingent repayment is the
only insurance most borrowers need. After all, unless the cost can
effectively be shifted to later generations, our middle-class citizens
had better, over their lifetimes, come up with sufficient resources to
finance (at least) all of their expenditures. Because we fail to realize
that the problem is really one of timing, we continue to devote too
much of our limited collective resources to those who eventually can
easily foot the bill, while depriving those who really need the boost.12
11. Cf. D. Bruce Johnstone, International Perspectives: A Five-Nation Study, In
STUDENT LOANS: RISKS AND REALITIES 89, 97 (Joseph M. Cronin & Sylvia Q. Simmons
eds., 1987). Johnstone writes:
I do not think that there exists an interest rate high enough to carry a truly
unsubsidized student loan plan available to all students without collateral or
credit checks or risk-rating. . . . The international perspective underscores the
usefulness of a loan program that is subsidized enough to be accessible and not
overly burdensome, yet also so sufficiently unsubsidized to undergird that share
of costs deemed appropriate to be borne by students without the fear of its
being misused and converted to cheap capital by the non-needy family.
Id.
12. See, e.g., Neil Howe & Phillip Longman, The Next New Deal: Federal Enti-
tlement Reform, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1992, at 88, 90 (Congressional Budget Of-
fice research demonstrates that "the most affluent Americans actually collect slightly
more from the welfare state than do the poorest Americans. . . . Quite simply, if the
federal government wanted to flatten the nation's income distribution, it would do better
to mail all its checks to random addresses.").
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PART I: THE LIFE CYCLE TREATMENT OF HUMAN CAPITAL
INVESTMENT
A. Who Benefits from a College Education?
A college degree serves as the main portal to the great American
dream of a secure financial future. While we might perhaps suffer
from an oversupply of college graduates (as opposed to those who
might be better off trained in the vocational arts),' 3 the public views
access to a college education for all as a pillar of our egalitarian
society.' 4 A concerned populace, therefore, shudders at the ever-ris-
ing costs of higher education, which seemingly price all but the rich
or scholarship recipients out of the market. 15 The middle-class has
13. See, e.g., Ray Marshall & Marc Tucker, Building a Smarter Work Force,
TECH. REV., Oct. 1992, at 52, excerpted in Vocational Education: High-Skill Employ-
ees, CURRENT, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 17, 17 ("The economic future of the United States
depends mainly on the skills of the front-line work force, the people whose jobs will not
require a baccalaureate degree."). Politicians from both parties support federal aid for
school-to-workplace training for the 50% of young people who do not go on to college
(and the half of those who do not obtain a college degree). See, e.g., President William J.
Clinton, Remarks to the National Association of Counties by Satellite from the White
House (July 19, 1993), available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, FEDNEW File ("And for
the majority who don't attend college, we funded the boldest national apprenticeship
program ever."); House Republicans Introduce School-to-Work Transition Bill Calling
for Voluntary Standards, DAILY LAB. REP. Mar. 25, 1993, at Al; Reich and Riley
Sketch Broad Outlines of U.S. School-to-Work Transition System, DAILY LAB. REP.
Feb. 23, 1993, at All. "The United States is the only major industrialized nation that
lacks a formal system for helping youths make the transition from school to work .. .
National School-to-Work Transition and Youth Apprenticeship Act of 1993, H.R. 1454,
103d Cong., Ist Sess. § 3(5) (1993). "[T]he United States educational system continues
to be geared disproportionately toward meeting the needs of college-bound students." Id.
§ 3(6). "[I]n Germany, almost all eligible students apply for vocational training, which
substantially reduces the risk of unemployment for young people. . . ." Youth Appren-
ticeship Act of 1993, H.R. 1112, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(a)(2) (1993). "[A]bout
9,000,000 of the 33,000,000 United States youth age 16 to 24, or 27 percent of the
youth, lack the necessary skills to meet employer requirements for entry level positions."
Id. § 2(a)(7); see Career Pathways Act of 1993, S. 456, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993);
see also Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994).
14. NATIONAL COMM'N ON RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FIN. POSTSECONDARY EDUC.,
MAKING COLLEGE AFFORDABLE AGAIN, at x (1993). But see, e.g., Peter Schrag, Who
Pays for College?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 2, 1992, at B8 ("We have slowly persuaded
ourselves that everybody is entitled to go to some 'college' somewhere. No other society
has ever embraced such a radical idea."). Urban Institute Senior Fellow Isabel Sawhill
believes that government subsidies for expenditures in human capital, including on-the-
job training, "'improve social mobility and benefit society's have-nots,' as opposed to
physical capital subsidies, which tend to go to the already wealthy." J. Andrew Hoerner,
Enact Wide Range of Programs, Urges Urban Institute's Sawhill, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Oct. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File as 91 TNT 211-9.
15. See, e.g., News Conference, NATIONAL COMM'N ON RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FIN.
POST-SECONDARY EDUC., Subject: Release of the Commission's Report on Financing
Higher Education, Feb. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, FEDNEW File
long clamored for more governmental assistance, especially federal
assistance.
Our nation is better off by having a well-educated populace.16 This
does not necessarily mean, however, that government should bear the
costs of providing higher education to its young people. Some argue
that the government should pay for all costs of college because the
resulting increased earnings will more than compensate the fisc
through higher tax revenues.1" However, where the individual stu-
dents would obtain a college education without a subsidy, it would
be inefficient for government to provide one; nor would it be fair for
all taxpayers to send the children of the upper classes to college.16
We know that the "diploma premium" is real. The Commerce De-
partment recently found that on average a college graduate earns
nearly twice as much as a high school graduate.1 9 In examining who
(quoting Rep. Steve Gunderson) ("I mean, we're here because we know that the sons
and daughters of America cannot get into college right now unless they are terribly poor
or terribly rich. .. ").
16. See, e.g., Survey of Education: Human Capital, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1992, at
4, 5 (Special Supp. located after p. 64) [hereinafter Human Capital] (Education has
become such an important asset in rich countries because of "globalisation and automa-
tion. Globilisation means that many low-value-adding jobs are exported to poorer and
cheaper countries. Automation means that jobs that stay in rich countries are increas-
ingly done by machines. . . . You need intelligent workers to get the most out of intelli-
gent machines.").
17. See, e.g., John F. Morse, How We Got Here from There - A Personal Remi-
niscence of the Early Days, in STUDENT LOANS: PROBLEMS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES
3, 4 (Lois D. Rice ed., 1977) ("Senator [Wayne] Morse loved to provide graphs and
charts showing that increased tax revenues from enhanced earning power repaid the na-
tional investment many times over.").
18. See, e.g., Survey of Education: Making It Work, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1992,
at 16, 17 (Special Supp. located after p. 64) ("Governments spend too much on people
who are predestined for educational success and too little on people who are prone to
educational failure. . . . [I]f you want big returns on educational expenditure, invest in
the youngest."). England is currently engaged in the debate over whether to shift higher
education costs to students and their parents:
Many parents are infuriated by the suggestion that they or their offspring
will have to pay for the kind of student life that was accepted in their day as a
liberating right ...
But this "liberation" is really only a feature of our middle-class society: chil-
dren from professional/managerial backgrounds are still four times more likely
to go to university than their working-class contemporaries.
Colin Hughes, Why Students Must Learn to Pay; Those Who Gain Most from Higher
Education Should Contribute More, INDEPENDENT, July 21, 1993, at 22.
19. In just seven years, the percentage of American adults with a "degree beyond
high school" leapt from one-in-five to one-in-four (from 20.7% in 1984 to 25.2% in
1990). REBECCA SUTTERLIN, COMMERCE DEP'T, PUB. No. P-70-32 WHAT'S IT WORTH?
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC STATUS: SPRING 1990 (1993). Based on
data from the Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),
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gained from the expanding economy in the 1980s, we find that it was
the college-educated who pulled away from the pack." A diploma
generally pays off quickly,21 and keeps paying off at an accelerated
rate.2
Society should properly subsidize the cost if the public would be
better off by a particular student's choice of education but the
human capital investment would not be "profitable" for her." First,
though, if the market inadequately compensates certain workers, we
should examine why salaries do not simply rise. The answer might
be, in many cases, that the compensation package is partially non-
monetary. Artists generally don't have to punch a clock; ministers
can be admired for doing good. We do not include psychic income in
the national income and products accounts, but it is real, and factors
into a calculation to enter a particular field. Even if we believed that
Vocational 1,237
Some college, no degree 1,280
High school graduate 1,077
Not a high school graduate 492
Id.; See also Robert M. Hauser, Trends in College Entry among Whites, Blacks, and
Hispanics, in STUDIES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN HIGHER EDUCATION 61 (Charles T.
Clotfelter & Michael Rothschild eds., 1993); Kevin Murphy & Finis Welch, Wage Pre-
miums for College Graduates: Recent Growth and Possible Explanations, 18 EDUC. RE-
SEARCHER 17 (1989).
20. See, e.g., NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 1992, at 84 (1992) (comparing 1980 and 1990, the earnings
advantage increased about 23% for white college graduates and about 28% for black
college graduates) (calculations by author); W. Norton Grubb, The Varied Economic
Returns to Postsecondary Education: New Evidence from the Class of 1972, 28 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 365 (1993) (fundamental difference between the labor markets for college
graduates and for those with sub-baccalaureate education); Daniel E. Hecker, Recon-
ciling Conflicting Data on Jobs for College Graduates, MONTHLY LAB. REV., July 1992,
at 3 ("relative earnings increase for college graduates was the result of a worsening job
market for male high school graduates, not because of a shortage of workers with college
degrees").
21. See, e.g., College Dividend: Diploma is Worth $1,039 Extra a Month, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 28, 1993, at N5 (explaining Census Bureau data: "At that rate, and not
taking taxes into account, it takes the typical four-year graduate just a little under two
years after getting out of school to accumulate enough of the extra pay to cover his or
her tuition bill.").
22. See, e.g., Human Capital, supra note 16, at 4 ("Educational success in youth
seems to pay mounting dividends in maturity .... [Ulniversity graduates ... discover
that each step upwards is increasingly remunerative .... [Tihe well-educated land jobs
that provide them with more training, while the uneducated are locked out of opportuni-
ties to improve their skills.").
23. Additionally, government might properly subsidize on-the-job training, because
firms cannot always capture the full value of training: an employee could simply move to
another employer. See, e.g., Hoerner, supra note 14.
we do not have enough artists, social workers, or ministers, the solu-
tion is not necessarily for the government to finance the education of
students in these fields. If anything, subsidizing inputs is a crude
way to stimulate the production of outputs. That is, paying for a
nineteen-year-old's college major in the hopes that the graduate will
pursue that field, and continue to for the next forty years,24 is far
less efficient than for the government to, say, buy works of art or
reimburse favored uses of social services.2 5 If anything, the govern-
ment should encourage the dissemination of accurate information
about payoffs to various forms of education.26
B. Intergenerational vs. Interfamily Warfare
Will the millennium in the United States be marked by a final
break between the generations? With "serial fathers," deadbeat
24. Cf. Charlotte V. Kuh, Comment, in STUDIES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN
HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 19, at 179, 181 (response to Jerry R. Green, Future
Graduate Study and Academic Careers, in STUDIES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN
HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 19, at 145) ("One thing that I have found striking for
my own class of Radcliffe women is how few of us are now doing what we planned to do
on graduation.").
25. The Constitution prevents the government from purchasing religious outputs,
but the federal government provides large input subsidies to the religious sector through
tax exemption for churches (I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)), income tax exemption for parsonage
allowances (I.R.C. § 107), and (for those who itemize their tax deductions) deductibility
of donations to churches (I.R.C. § 170).
26. See, e.g., Address by President-Elect Bill Clinton at Wilbur Wright Commu-
nity College, Chicago, Illinois, Dec. 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
FEDNEW File ("[W]hat we really need to do. . . is to make sure that none of you are
being defrauded in America. That . . . we should have enough information - honest,
good, reliable information - to tell you what the prospects are on the other end, what
the demand is"); cf. Jayne de la Huerga, Misled Student?, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 26, 1992, at
C26 (letter to the editor) ("If there be a moral to this story, it is for the student to
research future employment trends before committing oneself to a major. With a surfeit
of tenured professors, don't ever expect the universities to give you the straight dope on
anything - least of all employment opportunities."). But see Kenneth J. Cooper, Ques-
tioning the Need to Repay School Loans; Judge Says State Law May Free Students of
Obligation When Training Is Inadequate, WASH. POST, July 22, 1991, at A9 (reporting
on preliminary ruling by West Virginia district court against Northeastern Business Col-
lege); Clinton Signs Education Act Technical Bill with No New Student Loan Bank
Suits, DAILY REP. EXECUTIVES, Dec. 21, 1993, at A243, available in LEXIS, NEWS
Library, DREXEC File (the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1993, Pub. L.
103-208, 107 Stat. 2457, was passed without a Senate amendment to allow borrowers to
sue lenders for refund of loans repaid if the student was misled into paying for an inade-
quate education - effectively, students still have such a remedy if they attend a proprie-
tary institution but not if they attend a nonprofit one); see also Student Loans: DoEd
Report Scrutinizes Trade Schools, DAILY REP. CARD, July 19, 1993, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, RPTCRD File (explaining that because of high default rates at
proprietary schools, the government winds up spending thousands of dollars per student
to train cosmetologists, security guards, court stenographers, computer technicians, medi-
cal assistants, and truck drivers, despite the glutted job market in these fields). See gen-
erally Charles F. Manski, Adolescent Econometricians: How Do Youths Infer the
Returns to Schooling?, in STUDIES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN HIGHER EDUCATION,
supra note 19, at 43.
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dads, and increasing proportions of children born to single mothers,
many children lose all or most ties to half of their progenitors.17 At
the same time, the Gray Lobby puts visible, increasing financial bur-
dens on their working children and those not yet born - pressure
that might lead to a rebellion against perceived golf-cart grannies,"
who retire earlier, live longer, and have a lower percentage of pov-
erty than households with children.29 In the midst of this, federal
support for the greatest legacy parents can give their kids - a col-
lege education - shifts from a system of grants to a system of loans,
saddling those entering the workforce with up to tens of thousands of
dollars of debt.
27. See, e.g., Dennis A. Ahlburg & Carol J. De Vita, New Realities of the Ameri-
can Family, POPULATION BULL., Aug. 1992, at 2, 4 (stating that about half of children
will live with only one parent before age 18).
28. The twentysomethings have formed groups such as "Lead or Leave" (whose
advisory board cochairman is Paul Tsongas) to assert clout against the American Associ-
ation of Retired Persons ("AARP") and others whom they feel have mortgaged their
future. See, e.g., Heather A. Hope, Youth Advocacy Group Protests Federal Deficit,
TAX NOTES TODAY, July 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File as
93 TNT 148-7; Jeff Kunerth, Generations Do Battle Over Social Security, Hous.
CHRON., May 9, 1993, at A10 ("With 34 million members - half the nation's elderly -
the AARP is the 800-pound gorilla of Washington, D.C.. . . Representing 12 percent of
the population, the AARP's constituency commands 30 cents of every dollar spent by the
federal government"). The satiric troupe, Capitol Steps, sings the following lyrics to the
Crosby, Stills & Nash tune of "Teach Your Children Well" (which they call "Tax Our
Children Well"):
We who are old and gray will make you pay so we'll be set up.
Or else we'll stay in town; she just fell down, and (she) can't get up.
It's you we're living off, so we can golf and buy our dentures.
Politicians who ask why, we pulverize and fry, while we bleed you yuppies dry
- because we love you.
Thomas J. Brazaitis & Michelle R. Washington, Busters vs. Geezers; Young Want Cuts
in Social Security, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 21, 1993, at Cl; cf. Charles Laurence,
Our Parents Trashed the Nation's Institutions, Leaving Us to Wade Through the Flot-
sam. We Will Suffer Lower Living Standards Because They Borrowed Money, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, May 11, 1993, at 17 (nor are the Baby Boomers safe from the wrath of
younger adults; quoting Robert Lukefahr, age 29: "Let's start at their finest hour, Wood-
stock. . . . Few of the attendees purchased tickets; most simply crashed the fence as if it
were some sort of birthright. Three days later, the farm lay in ruins. . . . Boomers de-
clared the concert a triumph and left the mess for those who followed behind."). See
generally DOUGLAS COUPLAND, GENERATION X: TALES OF AN ACCELERATED CULTURE
(1990) (a statistic-laden novel).
29. Murray Gendell & Jacob S. Siegel, Trends in Retirement Age by Sex, 1950-
2005, MONTHLY LAB. REv., July 1992, at 22; Howe & Longman, supra note 12, at 95
(stating that in 1969, 25 % of the elderly and 14% of children were officially designated
as poor; in 1990, 12% of the elderly and 21% of children were poor); cf. Peter Gorner &
Ronald Kotulak, Do We Want to "Cure" Aging? Extending Life Raises Fear As Well As
Hope, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 1991, at C1 ("Former Colorado Gov. Richard Lamm hit a
raw nerve in 1984 when he was quoted as saying that older people 'have a duty to die
and get out of the way.' ").
On the family level, one can doubt whether most Americans above
the poverty line suffer from an increased generational split. Gener-
ally, the family forms a cohesive economic unit whose goal is to pre-
serve family assets (human capital as well as financial capital)
30
while shifting as many costs as possible to outsiders. Thus, we might
really be witnessing an interfamily struggle masquerading as an in-
tergenerational one. That is, popular support for federal entitlement
programs seems based on the perception that the cost will be borne
by, someone else, or, at worst, by someone else's dds.31 Why else
would you see a family complain that Medicare should pay for long-
term nursing home care so that the elderly parents can leave their
substantial savings to their children?
32
At the societal level, issues of intergenerational equity are debated
in the context of federal deficit spending. In analyzing who bears the
burden of the federal deficit, economists Alan Auerbach, Jagadeesh
30. See generally Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J. POL.
ECON. 1063, 1077 (1974) ("[Alithough children usually eventually set up their own
households and fully control their own incomes, the head [of the family] would guide and
help finance their investments in education and other human capital to maximize the
present value of the real income yielded by these investments.").
31. Perhaps this explanation gives the general population too much credit. Cf.
Kathleen Day, Soaring Bailout Cost Puts S&L Crisis in Public Eye, WASH. POST, June
4, 1989, at H1 ("'Why can't the government pay for [the savings and loan bailout]
instead of the taxpayer?' asked one man, a question cheered by the crowd of several
hundred people.").
32. See, e.g., The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 29,
1993) available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, MACLEH File (interview with Paul Hewitt,
National Taxpayers Union) ("[Slay somebody with $ 1/2 million, which is not an un-
usual case for an elderly family . . ., if they don't spend the extra thousand dollars a
year [on long-term care insurance] . . . to protect their wealth . . . then . . . they and
their heirs will suffer the consequences. There is a program for poor people. It is [Medi-
caid]."). OBRA 1993 tightened up loopholes that allow the elderly to appear to be
"spending down" their wealth while maintaining effective control or enjoyment of in-
come. OBRA 1993, supra note 8, § 13611; H.R. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
834-35 (1993) [hereinafter OBRA Conference Report]; see Richard Schroeder, A
Threat to Senior's Security, BuFF. NEWS, June 23, 1993, § Your Money, at 1; compare
Cheryl Lavin, The Medicaid Game: To Qualify for Nursing Home Assistance, Some
People Become Paupers on Paper. It's Legal, But Is It Right?, CH. TRm., Jan. 31, 1993,
at C1 ("Sen. Carol Moseley-Braun (D-Ill.) . . . was criticized for taking part of her
mother's windfall check of $28,750 from the sale of timber rights while her mother's
nursing home bills were being paid by Medicaid." However, "there's no law that makes
children financially responsible for their parents.") with Jonathan Marshall, A Warning
on Cost of Long-Term Care, S.F. CHRON., May 26, 1993, at A4 ("Germany. . . keeps
its institutionalization rate below that of the United States in part by weighing the finan-
cial resources of both the elderly and their grown children before paying for care.") and
Stephen A. Moses, Stop the Medicaid Gravy Train, BEST'S REv. - LIFE-HEALTH INS.
ED., Oct. 1991, at 128, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, BRLIFE File (explaining
that if, as the Inspector General of Health and Human Services recommended in 1988
and 1989, Congress mandated asset recovery from the estates of Medicaid nursing home
beneficiaries, both generations would have an incentive to obtain long-term care insur-
ance, perhaps from the parents' "massive home equity - in excess of $800 billion na-
tionally"). Congress adopted such a rule in OBRA 1993, supra note 8, § 13612.
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Gokhale, and Laurence Kotlikoff recently posited "generational ac-
counts" to illuminate how much "different generations [are] paying
to finance government consumption and to subsidize each other."3
Their theory is driven by the recognition that somebody has to pay,
if not now then later - this is, in economics terms, "the govern-
ment's intertemporal budget constraint. '3 4 Their generational ac-
count analysis of the federal deficit calculates both expected
government receipts (tax collections) and expected transfer pay-
ments (such as Social Security and Medicare).35 The study con-
cludes, among other things, that significant "birth bills" could be
presented to those born in 1989 and in later years: "[U]nless policy
toward existing generations . . . is substantially altered . . ., future
generations will face a roughly 20% larger net tax burden over the
course of their lifetimes than current newborns." 6 A more thorough
treatment of generational accounts by Professor Kotlikoff reveals the
1950s through the 1970s to be the greatest era of increasing burdens
on future generations, while the 1980s (largely due to the Social Se-
curity funding reforms) actually benefited future generations.
37
This generational account approach makes certain controversial
and difficult assumptions and rejects others. First, it assumes that
deficit spending is making our children worse off: the resolution of
this question depends on how the government is spending the money,
and the implications for growth.38 Additionally, the theory rejects
33. Alan J. Auerbach et al., Generational Accounts: A Meaningful Alternative to
Deficit Accounting, in 5 TAx POL'Y & EcoN. 55, 57 (David Bradford ed., 1991). Presi-
dent Clinton's FY 1995 Budget includes a novel section on generational accounting. See
Clinton Budget Cites Age-Based Disparities in Tax Treatment, Based on 'Generational
Accounting,' Feb. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File, as 94
TNT 31-63 (containing excerpt from the Budget Report).
34. Auerbach et al., supra note 33, at 59. That is, the government must live within
its means, taking into account its ability to finance a current "expansionary" (debt-fi-
nanced) budget through future taxes.
35. Id. at 65, 69-71.
36. Id. at 92. The authors further estimated that federal government zero growth
("getting spending under control") would reduce the burden on future generations by
more than one-fourth of what it otherwise would be. Id. at 91. "The effect of [a zero-
growth] policy is to lower the present value of government consumption by $1.306 tril-
lion, which is sizable compared to what would otherwise be the burden on future genera-
tions, namely $4.903 trillion." Id.
37. LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING: KNOWING WHO
PAYS, AND WHEN, FOR WHAT WE SPEND 166-85 (1992).
38. See, e.g., Robert Eisner, Deficits: Which, How Much, and So What?, 82 AM.
ECON. REv. PAPERS AND PROC. 295, 297 (1992) (the deficit is not measured right if
government expenditures are "financing real government investment in public capital or
private households' investment in durable goods or human capital"); David M. Cutler,
Book Review, NAT'L TAX J., Mar. 1993, at 61, 66 (reviewing KOTLIKOFF, supra note
Robert Barro's assumption that the altruistic motives of the senior
generation will cause them to maintain current consumption at the
level it would have been absent the effective transfer program, al-
lowing them to pass through the government transfers to the next
generation as increased bequests.3" Finally, impairing the notion that
generational accounting can accurately calculate "birth bills" for
each newborn age group, nothing keeps future generations from "de-
faulting" when the bills fall due, by rolling over Treasury borrowing
and promising to raise taxes another X years down the road.40
In our current frigid climate of deficit reduction, federal aid to
college students has increasingly shifted from a program of grants to
a program of loans.41 As a result, two education scholars have ac-
cused current parents of breaking the educational "intergenerational
compact. '42 No model of who should pay for college is more right
37), reprinted in 60 TAX NOTES 361, 364 (Robert J. Wells ed., 1993) ("Kotlikoff's
generational accounts ignore the distribution of nonentitlement spending, since it is un-
clear ex ante how much each generation values them. One could argue, however, that the
returns to military spending in the past several decades have been very large."). More-
over, deficit spending did not occur by accident; policymakers counted on the Ponzi
scheme of succeedingly successful standards of living. See, e.g., Phillip Longman, Justice
Between Generations, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1985, at 73, 76 (quoting economist
Gordon Tullock that to deprive one's generation at the expense of the next would
"'clearly tax the poor to help the rich' "). See generally Cutler, supra, at 64 ("A fair
reading of the evidence is that the available evidence does not offer firm conclusions
about the economic effects of the deficit.").
39. See Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82 J. POL, EcON.
1095 (1974). Contra B. Douglas Bernheim & Kyle Bagwell, Is Everything Neutral? 96
J. POL. ECON. 308 (1988) (because any one person is part of so many different family
groups, Barro's altruistic model produces absurd neutrality results). Even if the senior
generation wanted to neutralize government programs, it would need a tremendous
amount of information to ferret out all the effective government transfers. See HARVEY
S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 425 (2d ed. 1988) ("Information on the implications of cur-
rent deficits for future tax burdens is not easy to obtain. . . . Is it sensible to think that
people seek out this information, correctly analyze it, and then use the information to
make optimal bequests?"); cf. Social Security: Data Show Class of Retirees Already
Will Receive Less in Benefits than Taxes Paid, DAILY TAX REP., Mar. 12, 1993, at G-5,
G-6 ("[John] Shoven also suggested that [the] Social Security [Administration] institute
a mailing of annual statements to all participants to inform them of their status in the
system and to educate them on the need for supplementary saving to finance an adequate
standard of living in retirement.").
40. Cutler, supra note 38, at 65 (arguing that one cannot meaningfully assign an
expected value to taxes and spending, because "how is one to know which promises the
government would keep?").
41. NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 20, at 331, Tbl. 47-2 (the
guaranteed student loan program grew 82.7 % in constant dollars from 1980 to 1991, and
cost the federal government $4.2 billion in 1991); see also THOMAS G. MORTENSON, ACT
STUDENT FIN. AID RES. REP. SERIES, PUB. No. 90-1, THE IMPACT OF INCREASED LOAN
UTILIZATION AMONG Low FAMILY INCOME STUDENTS 4, Fig. 1 (1990) (showing that
from 1975 to 1988, the percentage of federal financial aid representing gifts declined
steadily from over 75 % to just over 30%, while the percentage representing loans in-
creased steadily from 20% to 65% - the lines look like a giant "X" on the grid). The
federal student loan program is discussed infra part II.B.
42. MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON & MORTON 0. SCHAPIRO. KEEPING COLLEGE AF-
FORDABLE: GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 175 (1991).
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than another, they say; it's just that the current generation of adults
gets the transitional free ride. Another scholar states the issue more
bluntly: "Finally, as a part of a far broader moral question of public
finance, by what right does a generation of adults educated without
loans obligate their children to pay for their own education?"4 3 An
argument like this resonates in an era coming to grips with a new
concept of family, where ties form, are broken, and are reformed
with new "parents.""" However, a contrary view suggests that the
tradition of parents' funding their children's education "is breaking
down in any case, due both to the prolongation of graduate and pro-
fessional education well into young adulthood and to the increasing
desire of the young for emancipation from parental authority and
responsibility. 45
In examining the underlying claim that a shift from grants to
loans represents a shift from the older to the younger generation,
let's not get tricked by the nominal incidence, as opposed to the eco-
nomic incidence, of the burden. When the government bestows col-
lege grants, who pays? You want to say "current taxpayers" - who
are much more likely to be the parents of the students than the stu-
dents themselves. As we just saw, however, the government cannot
definitively impose costs on any particular generation, and grants
might be borne by each generation of college students, through
higher taxes during their working lives.
Additionally, state and local colleges and universities charge the
43. MORTENSON, supra note 41, at 50. As just discussed, analysis of deficit spend-
ing is more complicated - for example, the resulting expansion of the economy in the
1980s made possible higher compensation levels for college graduates, so the investment
might already be paying off for them.
44. See, e.g., Ahlburg & De Vita, supra note 27, at 30 (" 'Through divorce and
remarriage, individuals are related to more and more people, to each of whom they owe
less and less.' ") (quoting FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED
FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 95 (1991)); cf. Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 633 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (a welfare program that
punishes families when fathers stay involved in the financial lives of their children recalls
Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic Republic: "[E]ach citizen will have a thousand sons:
they will not be the sons of each citizen individually: any and every son will be equally
the son of any and every father; and the result will be that every son will be equally
neglected by every father.") (alteration in original) (quoting THE POLITICS OF ARIS-
TOTLE 44 (Ernest Barker trans., 1958)).
45. D. BRUCE JOHNSTONE, NEW PATTERNS FOR COLLEGE LENDING: INCOME CON-
TINGENT LOANS 14 (1972); see also Morse, supra note 17, at 4 (in 1958 Congress en-
acted a student loan program rather than a direct grant program in part because the
House leaders "who had gone to college had done so during the Depression years. They
had, literally, worked their way through college and saw no reason why succeeding gen-
erations could not do likewise.").
student a fraction of the cost of an education at a private institution,
where costs are much less far apart.46 Who "pays" for this sub-
sidy?47 Forty-eight states require a balanced enacted budget. Thus,
it appears that current taxpayers bear state expenses. However, state
requirements focus primarily on balancing the "general fund," which
ranged from twenty-one percent to seventy-four percent of total state
spending in fiscal year 1990.48 General funds exclude state funds
such as those for capital improvements, which are financed primarily
from borrowing; so, along with neglected infrastructure spending'4
we are back where we started from.
Even within a family, you cannot determine who bears the burden
of a particular financial obligation without knowledge of all other
transfers - past, current, and future - that will be made among its
members. 50 In the simplest case, the student's parents can make gifts
46. NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 20, at 136. Tuition charges
cover 19.5 % of costs at public institutions and 55.9% at private institutions. Id. at 134.
See also Helen F. Ladd, Comment, in STUDIES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN HIGHER
EDUCATION, supra note 19, at 278 (response to John M. Quigley & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Public Choices in Higher Education, in STUDIES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN HIGHER
EDUCATION, supra note 19, at 243) ("In 1989, spending on higher education accounted
for 20 percent of total direct spending by states and exceeded 25 percent in 11 states.").
States do not deprive higher-income students of the subsidized tuition. See, e.g., Samuel
Weiss, Study Says Middle Class Are Drawn to SUNY, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at
B18 (report by a group representing private institutions showed that 60% of full-time
undergraduates at the State University of New York's four-year schools come from fami-
lies whose annual income exceeds $50,000, compared with only 45% in the state's pri-
vate schools, where average tuition is four times as high).
47. Perhaps "why" is a better question. Compare John M. Quigley & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Public Choices in Public Higher Education, in STUDIES OF SUPPLY AND DE-
MAND IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 19, at 256 ("legislatures in states with sub-
stantial private alternatives tend to charge higher tuition than do states with relatively
little to offer in the private sector") with Ladd, supra note 46, at 282-83 (are legislatures
trying to keep costs low at public colleges in order "to transfer resources to middle-
income taxpayers" or because they think low tuition will encourage growth in "the sup-
ply of human capital in the state?"). Over twenty years ago, the governor of Ohio pro-
posed that students graduating from institutions in the state (public or private) be
required to repay the state subsidy (without interest), at the rate of 2% of income (but
not for longer than thirty years). See JOHNSTONE, supra note 45, at 81 (characterizing
the Ohio Plan, which was never enacted by any state legislature, as a "state educational
income surtax"). A recent hot issue in the public higher education field is "high tuition,
high aid," to better target state subsidies to the needy. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMNI'N ON
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FIN. POST-SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 15, at 57-58 (expressing
concern that the recent trend appears to be high tuition, low aid).
48. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/AFMD-93-58BR,
BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: STATE EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1993).
49. Id.
50. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Taxation and Savings: A Neoclassical Perspective, 22 J.
EcON. LIT. 1576 (1984) (contrasting life cycle ("selfish") models, in which individuals
save in order to smooth their own lifetime consumption and so bequests play a small role,
with dynastic ("altruistic") models, in which saving for private intergenerational trans-
fers explains much of the current stock of U.S. wealth); Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Law-
rence H. Summers, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital
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to their child to enable her to repay the loan.5 1 The large investments
parents in America make in the education of their children leads to
the common observation that the greatest legacies we receive from
our parents and will leave to our children is human capital rather
than financial capital. 52
Transfers go the other way, too. The sandwich generation feels the
pinch of supporting their elderly parents just when their own chil-
dren reach college age.53 Recent economic literature argues that par-
ents accumulate sufficient capital to make bequests not out of
altruism or a sense of dynasty but as a weapon to hold over a child
in order to induce the child to provide necessary care to them in
their old age.54 According to this complex model of financial and
Accumulation, 89 J. POL. ECON. 706 (1981); Franco Modigliani, The Role of Intergener-
ational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in the Accumulation of Wealth, 2 J. ECON.
PERSP. 15 (1988).
51. Cf. David Altig & Stephen J. Davis, The Timing of Intergenerational Trans-
fers, Tax Policy, and Aggregate Savings, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1199, 1206 (1992) ("Par-
ents choose the timing of intergenerational transfers to exploit the wedge between the
after-tax borrowing rate faced by the child and the after-tax rate of return on own sav-
ings." Where borrowing rates exceed lending rates, "the marginal rate of substitution of
current for future consumption is higher . . . for children than for parents. Thus, trans-
fers early ... in the life cycle dominate transfers late . . . in the life cycle."). In one
study (whose sample was admittedly too small to allow for generalizations), however,
only 10.8 % of respondents stated that their parents have helped or intended to help them
pay off student loans. Dennis J. Martin, Repayment, Responsibility, and Risk, in STU-
DENT LOANS: RISKS AND REALITIES, supra note 11, at 25, 30-32 ("The most likely groups
of borrowers to report such help are those whose parents had incomes of $50,000 or more
(while the borrower was enrolled), younger borrowers recently out of school, and those
whose parents assisted in meeting college costs while the borrower was in school"; but
only 19% of respondents in these subsets reported parental repayment assistance). The
same study showed that 9 % of respondents borrowed from their parents. Id. at 34, Tbl.
2-1.
52. See, e.g., Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON.
REV. 1, 11 (1961) (estimating that "the stock of education in the labor force rose about
eight and a half times between 1900 and 1956, whereas the stock of reproducible capital
rose four and a half times, both in 1956 prices"); cf. Barro, supra note 39, at 1104 ("the
crucial consideration" for the neutrality result "is an operative intergenerational transfer,
rather than an operative bequest motive per se. For example, the transfer could take the
form of parental expenditure on the children's education, etc.").
53. See, e.g., Barbara Vobejda, Caring for 3 Generations; Families Juggle Needs
of Elderly, Young, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1990, at Al ("The growth of the so-called
'sandwich generation' is the coincidental result of two demographic trends: prolonged life
span . . . and the tendency among couples to delay marriage and childbirth into their
thirties"); Lee Smith, What Do We Owe the Elderly?, FORTUNE, Mar. 27, 1989, at 54.
54. See, e.g., Donald Cox & Mark R. Rank, Inter-Vivos Transfers and Intergener-
ational Exchange, REV. ECON. & STAT. 305, 307 n.4 (1992) ("[P]arental compensation
for services need not be contemporaneous. Parents may defer payments as bequests to
insure that they have the 'last word' in bargaining with children. Alternatively, parents
might pay for services in advance if their children face liquidity constraints early in
labor interdependence, parents could not long gain from "shifting"
the economic burden for a college education onto their children. The
kids might just conclude that their parents are reducing the value of
their bequests, and so would reduce the level of their filial services. 55
But cost is only one side of the calculation. Because, as already
discussed, the students (and their families) can capture the financial
benefit of a college education, it seems odd that we base scholarships
and interest rate subsidies to students so greatly on their parents'
resources.56 In sum, an education that will pay off is precisely the
type of expenditure for which a loan is suitable. Government loans
are a better idea than grants not necessarily because children should
pay their own way but because families, if they are capable, should
pay their own way. We can expect a student to choose her courses
more wisely if she knows that she and she alone must finance the
expense. Put more theoretically, why should any one student (or her
family) have the right to require all taxpayers to support her human
life."); Longman, supra note 38, at 81 (describing fathers in Colonial New England re-
taining power over their middle-aged children by waiting as long as possible to convey
title to farmland; the remedy for children's increased independence in our post-agrarian
economy "has been to allow each generation to tax its children, through such programs
as Social Security and Medicare"); Robert A. Pollak, A Transaction Cost Approach to
Families and Households, 23 J. ECON. LIT. 581, 604 (1985). Specifically:
The altruistically motivated transfers one observes in the United States may
come in the form of less than fully efficient educational support to liquidity-
constrained children . . ., in-kind transfers by paternalistic altruists . . ., in-
centive-oriented transfers by altruistic parents concerned about free-riding chil-
dren . . ., and end-of-life transfers by parents concerned that children will
squander what they receive at an early age and ask for more....
While liquidity-constrained, paternalistic, and strategically constrained al-
truism may abound, our findings nevertheless indicate that changing the distri-
bution of resources within the extended family significantly changes its
distribution of consumption.
Joseph G. Altonji et al., Is the Extended Family Altruistically Linked? Direct Tests
Using Micro Data, 82 Am. ECON. REV. 1177, 1196 (1992). If parents and children within
a family tend to spend the money they have, this result bodes ill for hopes that current
large governmental transfer payments to the elderly are being saved for bequests. See
Cutler, supra note 38, at 64 (empirical studies of consumption under the life cycle or
permanent income theory demonstrate that people "are 'overly sensitive' to current in-
come," thus suggesting that a cash-flow accounting mechanism rather than a genera-
tional accounting mechanism more accurately describes the effects of the government
debt). I discuss the life cycle model of saving and consumption, along with Milton Fried-
man's permanent income hypothesis, in part I.C.3, in the context of a consumption tax;
and in part I.D, in the context of the lifetime pattern of earnings.
55. Barro calls for further analysis of the situation, posited by Gary Becker, where
"the child has some information on the size of his parents' estate and that - acting as a
good optimal controller - he regulates the amount of attention as a function of the
estate size." Barro, supra note 39, at 1106 n.14.
56. See, e.g., Michael S. McPherson & Mary S. Skinner, Paying for College: A
Lifetime Proposition, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1986, at 29, 34 (if we believe that students
should pay for their own education, then "[l]ong-term loans with income insurance could
permit students to handle the load, and family background could, at least in principle, be
largely ignored in determining how students would pay for college"). Current financial-
needs tests are discussed infra part II.B.
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capital investment decision? Otherwise, poorer taxpayers who did
not go to college subsidize those who did. We should devote our
scarce collective resources to those who cannot over a significant pe-
riod of their adult lives get by without financial aid.
57
C. When Does a New Taxpayer Come into Being?
In the previous section we finessed the unanswerable question of
who, as between parents and child, "bears" the burden of college
expenditures (and reaps the financial rewards). Theoretical perfec-
tion, however, is a luxury our public finance system cannot demand.
Our tax rules apply rough justice in determining "who is the tax-
payer" for purposes of reporting income or claiming deductions. Ex-
penditures on education for a young child appear to "belong" to the
parents, because we view young children almost as items of con-
sumption by parents. We treat college expenses more ambiguously, if
not ambivalently. In part I.E we review the tax treatment of higher
education expenditures. Whose expenditures are these?
Consider the following examples of household or family arrange-
ments that our tax system addresses very simplistically:
- A married couple moves from a one-bedroom apartment to a three-bed-
room house when they start a family. 8 Is any part of the expenses of the
57. Theodore Schultz notes: "Physical capital that is formed by public investment
is not transferred as a rule to particular individuals as a gift." Schultz, supra note 52, at
15. Why, then, might it be appropriate for the government to spend money on human
capital whose benefits can be captured by the educated? Schultz suggests that such a
policy might further a "strong welfare goal of our community ... to reduce the unequal
distribution of personal income among individuals and families." Id. However, Schultz
also calls for long-term private and pubic loans to students as a remedy for capital mar-
ket imperfections. Id. (note that this 1961 article pre-dates the Higher Education Act of
1965 that created the guaranteed student loan program, discussed infra part II.B).
58. Compare:
[T]he British obsession with buying a home rather than renting one is perni-
cious. It restricts labour mobility: unemployed workers who own rather than
rent cannot easily move to find jobs. It diverts money from more productive
investment. And the housing market has been an engine for inflation. A coun-
try less obsessed with home ownership might be less prone to booms and busts;
witness Germany.
After the Crash: Britain's Home Buyers and Lenders Need Less Help, Not More, ECON-
OMIST, Nov. 21, 1992, at 14, 17 [hereinafter After the Crash]. The U.S. treasury loses a
combined $86 billion a year from the deductibility of home mortgage interest and prop-
erty tax, the deferral of gains on sales of principal residences, and the exclusion of gains
on principal residence sales by those aged fifty-five and over. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM.
ON TAX'N, 103D CONG., IST SESS., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR Fis-
CAL YEARS 1994-1998, Tbl. 1 (Comm. Print 1993) (under the category "Commerce and
Housing") [hereinafter JOINT COMM., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES] (as
described in part I.E.2, however, an interest deduction is not the "tax expenditure," but
larger abode allocable to the children? What if an adult child moves back
in with her parents - does it (should it) matter whether the parents charge
her rent?59
9 Kate and Allie, two single mothers, move into a house together, with their
children, to keep down expenses and to share childrearing duties. At what
rate do they pay tax on their two salaries and other income?10
* A 17-year-old, who hopes to be a dancer, breaks her ankle. Her medical
costs may be taken into account on her parents' tax return, 1 even though,
like an investment in a college education, the expenditure will increase her
future earnings capacity.
2
* A middle-aged widow pays her mother-in-law's nursing home expendi-
tures. State law imposes no obligation to support adults; if the annual bills
rather the tax expenditure is the failure of our system to tax imputed rental income; see
BRADFORD, supra note 3, at 2). We lose at a personal level, too, from the stress that
saving up for our own home - the great American dream - brings to our young adult
years. After the Crash, supra, at 17 ("Buying a house is reckoned to be the most stress-
ful experience in an individual's life, after marriage and divorce, and is a not-infrequent
cause of the latter.)".
59. Recent news stories attest to the growing trend in baby birds who either refuse
to leave the nest, or who return after college. See, e.g., Richard Whitmire, Older Chil-
dren Staying at Home with Parents, Feb. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Li-
brary, GNS File (according to the Census Bureau, 58 % of unmarried Americans
between twenty and twenty-four lived with their parents in 1992); Katherine Boo, Grow
Up Twenty-Somethings. You Can Go Home Again, WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 1992, at 31
("Today, thanks largely to high rents and low wages, more than 18 million single adults
aged 18-34 live with their parents - a phenomenon that has the psychologists apoplec-
tic. 'Failed adults,' they term these young people: a generation of budding Norman
Bateses spoiled by affluent parents."); see also, Jane Bryant Quinn, Feeling the Boome-
rang Effect, Many Young Single Adults Are Going Home to Live With Mom and Dad,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12, 1993, at ClI (only 25% of kids pay any rent to their parents).
60. A tax schedule halfway between that for a single taxpayer and that for mar-
ried taxpayers at the same combined income applies for a "head of household" (gener-
ally, a single taxpayer with at least one child). I.R.C. § 1(a)-(c) (rates); I.R.C. § 63(c)
(standard deductions). Congress's General Accounting Office (GAO) urged repealing the
existing complicated support calculations required to claim both the dependency deduc-
tions and favorable head of household status, and replacing these rules with one that
looked simply to the residence of the child. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFCE, PUB. No.
GAO/GGD-93-60, TAX ADMINISTRATION: ERRONEOUS DEPENDENT AND FILING STATUS
CLAIMS (1993), available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File as 93 TNT 72-34
[hereinafter GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE]. A residency-based test reflects the "real-
ity" that "taxpayers already appear to be claiming exemptions when the dependent lives
with them." Id.; see also Tax Simplification for Families Act of 1993, S. 939, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), proposed by Senators Moynihan and Packwood, discussed infra
note 84. The GAO recognized, however: "If the maintenance test were eliminated, single
parents who share housing or receive housing assistance from government or other
sources could each file as a head of household. We do not know how this change would
affect the number of head of household claims." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra.
61. A taxpayer may claim, to the extent they exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross in-
come, medical expenses paid for the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, and a dependent of
the taxpayer (special rules apply for divorced parents). I.R.C. § 213.
62. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 52, at 9; Paul B. Stephan III, Federal Income
Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1380-81 (1984). Indeed, in the
poorest economies, food can be an item of investment. Schultz, supra, at 5 ("On the
'hungry' steppes and in the teeming valleys of Asia, millions of adult males have so mea-
ger a diet that they cannot do more than a few hours of hard work." In these cases, "it is
certainly meaningful to treat food partly as consumption and partly as a current 'pro-
ducer good,' as some Indian economists have done").
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exceed $10,000 (as is likely),' 3 is the payment subject to gift tax?"
1. Income Tax Considerations
Our federal tax system has to deal with the metaphysical all the
time. The miracle of two souls combining into one reduces to the
simple rule: Were the two of you married on December 31 ?15 More-
over, we know for sure that life begins for federal tax purposes upon
the birth of a child.
66
63. The annual cost of a nursing home stay in 1988 averaged about $25,000; some
exceeded $75,000 or even $100,000. See Dana Shilling, Securities Funding of Long-
Term Care: A Step Toward a Private Sector Solution, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 2
(1991) ("Home care can be equally expensive, or even more costly ... because it may
be necessary to hire three shifts of unskilled workers as well as retaining the occasional
services of several health care professionals.").
64. Section 2503(e), added to the Internal Revenue Code by the Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, 95 Stat. 319 (1981), excludes from the gift tax
amounts paid for medical care for any person, regardless of their relationship. I.R.C.
§ 2503(e). The definition of "medical expenses" contained in Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-
6(b)(3) (1984) does not appear to reach the bulk of nursing home expenses.
65. OK, maybe not quite so simple. See I.R.C. § 7703 (equally brightline but ar-
bitrary rules in the case of death of a spouse and divorce or separation).
66. This question provided the script for a bizarre and ghoulish skirmish prompted
by anti-abortion members of Congress. In 1972, the Internal Revenue Service found it-
self considering a revenue ruling concluding that a taxpayer may claim a dependency
exemption "for his child who lived only momentarily after being prematurely born alive
in a hospital in an operation to terminate a pregnancy by induced abortion." See Gen.
Couns. Mem. 35,124 (Nov. 17, 1972). Evidently, no real taxpayer ever sought this op-
portunistic tax result. Rather, abortion foes raised the question because "[t]he possibility
that someone might [claim the dependency exemption] should not even exist." Lee A.
Sheppard, Senator Humphrey Continues Anti-Abortion Effort, 32 TAX NOTES 298, 301
(1986) (paraphrasing the position of Sen. Jesse Helms). The IRS Chief Counsel urged
the ruling drafters, in view of the "morally and emotionally sensitive issue of abortion,"
to adopt "a more general revenue ruling broad enough to cover all live births regardless
of their natural or artificial inducement." Gen. Counsel Mem. 35,124, supra. See Rev.
Rul. 73-156, 1973-1 C.B. 58 (result so modified).
The abortion foes had one more angle. In order to be entitled to a dependency exemp-
tion the taxpayer must provide over half the support of the dependent. I.R.C. § 152.
Because the only expenditures made for the aborted baby after it was born but before it
died were the medical expenses of the abortion itself, the next "logical" question was
whether these expenses counted as support of the baby. At the behest of Sen. Helms and
others, the Chief Counsel revoked its 1972 memorandum. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,394
(Aug. 5, 1985). The Service thereupon issued a new revenue ruling concluding: "Ex-
penses for an induced abortion . . . are not incurred for the benefit of the child and do
not qualify as an item of support . . . for a child born alive during the tax year." Rev.
Rul. 85-118, 1985-2 C.B. 59, 60, clarifying Rev. Rul. 73-156. Which prompted one tax
attorney to write to Tax Notes magazine:
What would we do without the IRS around to tell us in Rev. Rul. 85-118
that expenses incurred to induce an abortion do not qualify as an item of sup-
port under section 152 when the baby lives? There are easily thousands of
difficult tax law issues that we need guidance on, but instead we get garbage
like this from that esteemed agency. No wonder nothing is getting done.
The revenuer knows more than ontology. Nearly every issue in the
study of the federal income tax comes down to one (or a combina-
tion) of the "four questions," which the Internal Revenue Code, in
its ever-expanding prolixity, purports to answer to a certainty: What
is income? When is it income? To whom is it income? And, a differ-
ent kind of question, at what rate should that income be taxed?
The "to whom" question asks us to figure out which person in an
economic arrangement should be the taxpayer. Lawmakers and aca-
demics tend to focus on whether the family should be viewed as a
single taxpaying unit.6 7 Currently, the spouse with the secondary in-
come (usually the wife) generally pays tax at the primary earner's
marginal rate.68 Aside from married couples, 9 each family member
Joe Henderson, Letter to the Editor, 28 TAX NOTES 919 (1985).
Several conservative legislators then attempted to stall the 1986 Tax Reform Act (as
well as the nomination of Lawrence B. Gibbs to be IRS Commissioner) with various
anti-abortion proposals. See, e.g., Sheppard, supra, at 298. For example, Sen. Helms
introduced legislation to "clarify the IRS's definition of support and deny a deduction to
a parent who intended to abort a child, but had the 'misfortune' of having the baby
survive a few minutes." Helms Bill Would Clarify Cloudy IRS Ruling Regarding De-
pendent Deduction, 30 TAX NOTES 1011 (1986). History records both the successful en-
actment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 unsullied by special rules for abortion and a
successful tenure by Commissioner Gibbs.
67. Even our system of joint filing for spouses raises issues of tax fairness. As of
October 1991, 15 of the 24 countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development use the individual as the taxation unit for the earned income tax credit; five
countries have joint or family taxation; and four countries allow married couples to
choose between joint or individual declarations. International Taxes: OECD Report Says
More than Half of Member Countries Use Individual as Unit for EIC, DAILY TAX REP.,
Dec. 3, 1991, at G-9, G-10 (citing ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV.,
PUB. No. ISBN 92-64-03519-2, THE TAX/BENEFIT POSITION OF PRODUCTION WORKERS,
1987-1990 (1991)). As recently as 1970, only six countries recognized the individual as
the taxpayer. Id. Nine countries permit spouses to transfer some unused tax allowances
between them. Id. Four countries give no tax relief for marriage. Id. Six countries treat
"informal unions" between persons of different sexes as marriage for tax purposes. Id.
68. Professor McCaffery objects to this formula as "marginalizing" working wives.
Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 993-94 (1992). See also JOSEPH PECHMAN,
FEDERAL TAX POLICY 107 (5th ed. 1987) ("When the number of tax brackets and tax
rates was reduced in 1986, Congress decided to eliminate the two-earner deduction. Al-
though the lower tax rates moderate the disadvantage of two-earner couples, they did not
eliminate it entirely. Thus, on equity grounds, the two-earner deduction should be re-
stored."). The higher marginal rates contained in OBRA 1993, supra note 8, will only
exacerbate the marriage penalty. See I.R.C. § l(a).
69. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 1389 (1975); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allo-
cating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1980); Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver
Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1977); Laura A. Davis, Note, A Feminist Justification for the
Adoption of an Individual Filing System, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197 (1988). McCaffery
points out the Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes are applied separately to the
wages of each spouse, even though the benefits are, in many cases, based on the income
of the spouse. McCaffrey, supra note 68, at 996-1001.
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constitutes a distinct taxpaying unit.70 Accordingly, Congress's re-
cent attention has focused largely on devices for income-shifting
from high-income parents or grandparents to low-income children.
In some cases, Congress requires minors to pay tax at their parents'
marginal rate.7 1 Our complicated system of taxing trusts attempts to
assign income to the proper person. In addition, difficult issues arise
when families engage in income splitting by, for example, having the
parents hire the children7 2 or bringing them into the family business
conducted in partnership or S corporation form.
73
However, the financial resources of a household are affected pro-
foundly by the number and ages of the members of that household
(whether or not the members have any blood or legal relationship),
and their net financial contribution to or burden on that household 4.7
70. Note particularly I.R.C. § 73, which requires a minor child to include pay-
ments for her services in her income, even if the child does not receive payment. See, e.g.,
Allen v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 466 (1968), affd, 410 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1969) ($70,000 sign-
ing bonus paid by the Philadelphia Phillies baseball team to Richard Allen's mother
taxed to the child); see also I.R.C. § 6012(b)(2) (requiring guardian to file return on
behalf of individual unable to do so); I.R.C. § 6201(c) (if the child fails to pay tax on
service income, as opposed to investment income, the tax is also considered assessed
against the parent); Bassett v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 650 (1993) (child actress liable
for her parents' failure to file returns and pay tax, plus penalties); Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-
l(a)(4) (1986) (return of minor). In justifying this scheme, the Bassett court observed:
"It has been traditionally held that the parent is entitled to the wages of the child until
the child reaches majority." Bassett, 100 T.C. at 658.
71. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2095 (1986),
added the "kiddie tax," which generally requires the unearned income of minors to be
taxed at their parents' marginal rate. I.R.C. § l(g).
72. Compare, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-393, 1973-2 C.B. 33 (to avoid penalizing "the
father for employing his own child," reasonable wages paid for a minor child's services
are deductible as a business expense even though the child uses the wages for his support,
but, because of the father's support obligation, the value of meals and lodging furnished
is neither deductible by the father nor income to the child) with Fritschle v. Commis-
sioner, 79 T.C. 152 (1982) (where mother doing piece work at home causes her children
to perform 70% of the work, the mother, and not the children, must report the income,
because no one, including the mother, contracted or paid for the services of the children).
73. Very generally, these rules prevent the assignment of income by requiring that
those partners or S corporation shareholders who perform services (generally the parents
rather than the minor children) must first be adequately compensated out of partnership
or S corporation income. See I.R.C. § 704(e) (family partnership rules); I.R.C.
§ 1366(e) (S corporation version of the family partnership rules); see also I.R.C.
§§ 2701-2704 (estate freeze).
74. See, e.g., Daniel R. Feenberg & James M. Poterba, Income Inequality and the
Incomes of Very High-Income Taxpayers: Evidence from Tax Returns, in 7 TAX POL. &
ECON. 145, 150 (James Poterba ed., 1993) (Defining the income distribution over indi-
viduals raises the problem of how to treat spouses and children. "Do they receive a pro-
portional share of household income? If so, then if a single high-income taxpayer marries
a lower-income earner, she may drop out of the high-income category. The birth of chil-
dren to high-income households could have the same effect."). See infra part I.D. for
With limited exceptions, Congress ignores these factors.7r
Most basically, when does a child metamorphose from an item of
her parents' consumption into a taxpayer in her own right? Surpris-
ingly, this question receives scant attention in the law . 6 Aside from
the "kiddie tax" (pulling the young child with unearned income back
into the tax identity of the parent),77 we now have only the rules that
determine who may claim the "personal exemption" for a particular
individual.
7 8
Under our income tax, we generally treat a new taxpayer as com-
ing into existence when she earns significant income in a year. In
general, an individual need not file an income tax return for a partic-
ular year unless gross income exceeds both the exemption amount
and the appropriate standard deduction.79 Once a dependent's in-
come exceeds the personal exemption amount, she no longer may be
claimed as a dependent on anyone else's return. However, she still
need not file until her income exceeds both the exemption amount
and the appropriate standard deduction.
For example, assume a dependent's income consists exclusively of
$1,000 of babysitting earnings (about $20 a week). Whether he is
issues relating to income distribution.
75. Two of these exceptions, the dependency exemption and the filing status for
heads of households, illustrate that we often impose the heaviest burden on those least
able to bear it. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 60 (finding that four
million taxpayers made 6.1 million erroneous claims for the dependency exemption in
1988, in many cases simply by failing to keep adequate records; adding in an estimated
1.6 million erroneous claims for head of household filing status, the fisc suffered an esti-
mated $1.8 billion in lost revenues in 1988). Commonly, household-based income and
asset tests are applied for means-tested welfare programs, such as food stamps and Aid
to Families with Dependent Children. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
76. See Bittker, supra note 69, at 1448-53 (discussing the difficulties of taxing the
dependent on amounts her parents spend on her support, noting also that this "conduit"
model of income would tax the amounts at the child's presumably lower rate). See infra
part I.D. for discussion of progressive rates.
77. But cf. Gann, supra note 69, at 56 (discussing Hoeper v. Tax Comm'r of Wis.,
284 U.S. 206 (1931), which invalidated under the due process clause a state statute that
applied a single progressive tax schedule to the aggregate income earned by a husband,
wife, and children under age 18).
78. Under Internal Revenue Code section 151, the taxpayer may claim one exemp-
tion for himself or herself, and an additional exemption for each dependent who does not
file a joint return or who is not allowed as a dependent on another taxpayer's return. In
general, the taxpayer may deduct the exemption amount for any member of the house-
hold whose income is less than that exemption amount, although the exemption amount
may be claimed for a child regardless of income through age 18. (The dependency ex-
emption extends until age 24 for a student, which costs the fise about $850 million a
year; see JOINT COMM., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 58, at
Tbl. 1 (under the category "Education, Training, Employment and Social Services")).
Internal Revenue Code sections 151 and 152 (which defines "dependent") delineate the
rules in excruciating detail.
79. I.R.C. § 6012(a). In 1992, because of inflation adjustments, the personal ex-
emption was $2,300 and the standard deduction for a single filer was $3,600. However,
for a taxpayer claimed as a dependent on another's return, the standard deduction is
limited to $500 unless earned income is greater. See I.R.C. § 63(c)(5).
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fourteen years old or sixty-four years old, he files no return on his
own, but his personal exemption ($2,300 in 1992) may be claimed on
the return of the taxpayer providing his support. Observe that while
ignoring small amounts of pin money might be viewed as a sensible
result, no one pays tax on the $1,000 of babysitting income. The
household benefits from the dependent's entire personal exemption,
but bears no tax burden on the dependent's income. By contrast,
were the Code to require a dependent instead to file on his own, the
household would forfeit the benefit of his personal exemption (the
$1,000 taxable income would be eliminated anyway by his own stan-
dard deduction).
One economist recently conducted a study of income earned by
children aged fourteen to nineteen; she assumed that fourteen is the
age at which children are legally employable under most state laws,
and that "most children remain financially dependent on their par-
ents up to 1 year after completing high school."8 Excluding families
with college students, she found that children in two-parent homes
contribute an average of just five percent of family income.8 While
the average dollar amount (about $2,650 in 1990 dollars) falls short
of the amount requiring the child to file a tax return, it exceeds the
value of the personal exemption that may be claimed by parents.
Additionally, in the economic sense, as opposed to the tax-law sense,
"comparisons of children's income are difficult to make because in-
formal money transfers within the family, such as allowances and
gifts, obscure the money source and are difficult to count."82 Because
our income tax excludes gifts from taxable income,83 we view the
child as a taxpayer only when she participates in the market.
Congress could bring all earnings into the tax system,. and also
prevent income shifting, by adopting a simple but arbitrary age cut-
off or other bright line test for allocating tax effects between parents
and children. Like other simple but arbitrary rules, though, this one
would often fail to provide the "fair" result. The current rules on the
dependency deduction try for such simplicity: a child ceases to qual-
ify as a dependent upon reaching age nineteen, or, if a student, age
80. Mary A. Noeicker Guadagno, Impact of Children's Employment on the Eco-
nomic Status of Two-Parent Families, 5 FAM. EcoN. REV. 9, 11-13 (1992).
81. Id. "Results suggest that, unlike in previous generations, children in two-parent
families are not employed out of economic necessity .... This supports previous re-
search that parents view money as a useful tool for teaching children ethical and social
attitudes about the value of saving, budgeting, and planning." Id. at 15.
82. Id. at 10; see infra part I.C.2.
83. I.R.C. § 102.
twenty-four.84 However, policymakers might perhaps be unaware
that, as of the fall of 1990, about forty-four percent of college stu-
dents are older than twenty-four.85 Moreover, many students find
themselves attending higher education longer than their parents did,
either because they take more than four years to finish college or
because they pursue more postgraduate schooling.
2. Gift Tax Considerations
While our income tax excludes gifts, significant gratuitous wealth
transfers can be snared by the separate gift and estate tax. A parent
can incur gift tax on a transfer to a minor. However, a "gift" re-
quires detached and disinterested generosity. 86 Where a parent bears
an obligation to make the transfer under local support law, the
transfer constitutes neither income to the child nor a taxable gift by
the parent.8 7 By contrast, if Mom and Dad pay for their adult
daughter's living expenses, the expenditure is treated as consumption
by them rather than by the daughter (no deduction by them, but no
income to her), potentially subjecting Mom and Dad to the gift tax.
84. However, Congress must further resolve the allocation of the dependency de-
duction between two separated, divorced, or unmarried parents. Accordingly, the statute
additionally requires the claiming parent to provide over half the support of the child.
Senators Moynihan and Packwood recently introduced a bill simplifying the definition of
"dependent" and "child" for all purposes of the Code. Tax Simplification for Families
Act of 1993, S. 939, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993). This proposal would jettison the sup-
port test, and substitute for it a residency test: a parent could claim a personal exemption
for any child under age 19 (or 24 if a student) if the child merely lives with the taxpayer
for more than half the year. The proponents of this bill appear to inadvertently deprive
parents of a deduction for children they support who live on-campus.
85. NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 120 YEARS OF
AMERICAN EDUCATION: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT, Tbl. 24 n.1 (1993).
86. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
87. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 341 (1984) (transfers to minor chil-
dren in excess of the "necessities and conveniences of life," if in significant quantities,
raise gift tax issues); cf Michael J. McIntyre, Implications of Family Sharing for the
Design of an Ideal Personal Tax System, in THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX: PHOENIX
FROM THE ASHES 145, 161 (Sijbren Cnossen & Richard M. Bird eds., 1990) ("The im-
portant gifts, for family taxation purposes, are the annual gifts that finance the living
expenses of children and spouses earning less than their mate.").
474
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Transfers falling outside the support obligation 8 can often be cov-
ered with our comfortably large exclusions for certain gifts.8" The
$10,000 per year per donee exclusion from the gift tax provides a
general cushion.90 In addition, the Code excludes from the gift tax
any payment of tuition made to a qualified educational institution
(at any level of schooling), regardless of the relationship between the
donor and the beneficiary, thus favoring gifts of human capital over
gifts of physical or financial capital.91
3. Consumption Tax Considerations
Children's influence on family expenditures has recently grown,
due to the shrinking size of families (increasing each member's role),
the delay of parents' childbearing (increasing the amount spent on
children), and increasing trends in two-parent workers (seventy-three
percent of all wives worked in 1987, sixty-eight percent full-time)
and single-parent households (increasing the children's expenditure
authority).92 Most important for our purposes, the College Board's
1992 Annual Survey of Colleges pegged annual out-of-pocket costs
for the 1992-93 school year at about $15,000 for a four-year private
college or university and at about $5,800 at a state school. For the
middle fifty percent of schools, annual costs ranged from about
$6,000 to $11,000 at private institutions and from about $1,500 to
88. Much of the debate seems to occur at age 18, or under other principles deter-
mining whether one person has the obligation under state law to support another. See,
e.g., Sakovitz v. Sakovitz, 429 A.2d 1091 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981) (support obligation
generally terminates at age 18, unless the child is incapacitated or, more recently, the
child shows scholastic aptitude and the parents can afford to send him to college; how-
ever, where four years earlier, upon graduating from high school, the child expressed no
desire to go to college, and in reliance the father gave him funds to help him go into
business, "extension of this doctrine would create an unreasonable, open-ended burden on
parents who, at any stage in their lives, could be called upon to finance a college educa-
tion"). See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Postsecondary Education as Within
Nondivorced Parent's Child-Support Obligation, 42 A.L.R. 4TH 819 (1992).
89. See generally John G. Steinkamp, Common Sense and the Gift Tax Annual
Exclusion, 72 NEB. L. REV. 106 (1993).
90. Thus, parents can transfer as much as $40,000 to their married child ($10,000
per donor per donee).
91. I.R.C. § 2503(e). However, "[n]o unlimited exclusion is permitted for
amounts paid for books, supplies, dormitory fees, board, or other similar expenses which
do not constitute direct tuition costs." Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-6(b)(2) (1984).
92. Guadagno, supra note 80, at 10 ("[C]hildren influence more than $132 billion
of consumer spending for children's items such as snacks, toys, electronics, clothes, and
hobby supplies; housing items such as furniture, televisions, stereos, and yard equipment;
and family items such as vacations, automobiles, food, and recreation.").
$2,800 at public institutions.93
Thus, the already murky issues of "who's the taxpayer" under an
income tax get positively opaque when we consider a consumption
tax scheme. While specific proposals vary, a standard consumption
tax basically works like this: receipts minus investment equals con-
sumption. Only consumption gets taxed. The raison d'etre of a con-
sumption tax is to collect the same present value of tax on the
consumption regardless of when the consumption occurs. It achieves
this by eliminating the tax on returns on investment.94 In contrast,
by taxing investment income, an income tax "double taxes" savings.
We are already moving towards financing personal expenditures in-
curred at the end of life on a pretax basis through our multi-trillion
dollar private retirement system. 5 Indeed, by one estimate, the
United States is already about halfway between an income tax and a
consumption tax.96
Proponents of a consumption tax argue that a consumption tax
can be expected to raise more level amounts over an individual's life-
time, as she consumes before she earns income and after she retires.
Under the "permanent income" or "life cycle" theory, we project
our expected average annual lifetime income, and then borrow or
93. AMina Matas, College Planning 101: It's Never Too Early to Start Saving for
Child's Education, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 1993, § 6, at 1; see also Anthony Flint, Private
Colleges Try Not to Cross the $100,000 Line, B. GLOBE, Feb. 25, 1993, at I (average
annual cost comes to $12,874 at private four-year institutions who are members of the
National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, but some schools are
poised to break the $25,000-a-year barrier).
94. The generalizable result is that a full deduction of an investment up front is
equivalent to exempting the income stream from tax. This holds, true, however, only if
(1) the tax rate that would otherwise apply to the amount is the same in all years, (2)
taxpayers have no accumulated capital when the consumption tax is enacted, and (3) the
taxpayer cannot postpone consumption indefinitely (we have a closed system that treats
bequests as consumption). See Michael Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consump-
tion Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1602 (1979). In addition, the system assumes that (4)
taxpayers can borrow and lend risk-free; and (5) all income can be classified as from
wages or capital. Id. See generally, e.g., Mark Kelman, Time Preference and Tax Eq-
uity, 35 STAN. L. REV. 649, 674 (1983).
95. See, e.g., Joel Chernoff, U.S. Pension Assets Reach $4.4 Trillion, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, Jan. 25, 1993, at 1, 1, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, PENINV
File ("[P]ension assets eclipse the $4.2 trillion national debt and dwarf the $1.6 trillion
in financial assets held by life insurance companies, $1.35 trillion held by thrift institu-
tions, $1 trillion held by mutual funds or $553 billion held by money market funds.").
96. Don Fullerton et al., Replacing the U.S. Income Tax With a Progressive Col-
sumption Tax, 20 J. PUB. ECON. 3, 12-13 (1983) (considering investments in housing,
pensions, and life insurance, but not other financial assets such as tax-exempt municipal
bonds and not investments in human capital). See analysis in C. David Anderson, Con-
ventional Tax Theory and "Tax Expenditures". A Critical Analysis of the Life Insur-
ance Example, 57 TAX NOTES 1417, 1424 (1992). Note particularly one significant
failing of the current income tax: about 30% of accrued capital gains escape all income
tax via the rule allowing a stepped-up basis to heirs at death. See U.S. TREASURY DE-
PARTMENT, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE CAPITAL GAINS REDUCTIONS OF 1978, at 103
(1985); Donald W. Kiefer, Lock-In Effect Within a Simple Model of Corporate Stock
Trading, 43 NAT. TAX J. 75, 81 (1990).
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save the difference each year in order to smooth consumption.
9 7
While economists agree that lifetime income follows a hump-shaped
distribution (which peaks sometime in middle age), 98 they disagree
about how much consumption smoothing people can or are willing to
do.9" The life cycle theory deals inadequately with the practical
problem that if we have to dissave when we are young, before we've
earned income, where do we get the cash from to finance these ex-
penditures? An accurate consumption tax depends on the perhaps
fatal assumption that "[t]here exists a perfect capital market with
no uncertainty; all taxpayers can borrow and lend unlimited amounts
at a risk-free interest rate."1 ' Moreover, a consumption tax does not
help our perception that those with high "nondiscretionary" or so-
cially desirable expenditures should not have to bear tax on those
expenditures.10
97. For the permanent income theory, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE
CONSUMPTION FUNCTION (1957); for the life cycle theory of saving and consumption, see
Modigliani, supra note 50.
98. See part I.D for a discussion of the lifetime income pattern.
99. Compare Modigliani, supra note 50, at 15 with Laurence J. Kotlikoff, In-
tergenerational Transfers and Savings, 2 J. EcON. PERSP. 41 (1988) and Cutler, supra
note 38, at 64 ("[C]hanges in consumption appear far too sensitive to changes in income
for the life cycle model [of consumption smoothing] to be correct.") and DON FUL-
LERTON & DIANE L. ROGERS, WHO BEARS THE LIFETIME TAX BURDEN? 163 (1993)
(people tend to prefer rising consumption with age) and William J. Wiatrowski, Factors
Affecting Retirement Income, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1993, at 25, 27 (the elderly
reduce their consumption after retirement, according to data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' Consumer Expenditure Survey).
100. Stephan, supra note 62, at 1367 n.17; see ROSEN, supra note 39, at 472;
Zeldes, supra note 6; Hansen, supra note 6; see also BRADFORD, supra note 3, at 165
("It may be objected that ... it is preferable to have the earnings early in life. This
objection really expresses the inadequacy of the assumption . . .that [one who earns
more early in life and another who earns more later in life] have the same consumption
opportunities by virtue of their ability to borrow and lend in the capital market."); cf. 2
W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM, The Ant and The Grasshopper, in THE COMPLETE SHORT
STORIES OF W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM 486 (1952). Maugham wrote:
When I was a small boy I was made to learn by heart certain of the fables of
La Fontaine .... Among those I learnt was The Ant and the Grasshopper,
which is devised to bring home to the young the useful lesson that in an imper-
fect world industry is rewarded and giddiness punished. ...
M y sympathies were with the grasshopper and for some time I never
saw an ant without putting my foot on it.
Id.
101. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Revisiting the Income Tax vs. Consumption Tax
Debate, 57 TAX NOTES 1437, 1442 (1992). Graetz explains:
In thinking about abandoning the income tax in favor of consumption taxes, we
should avoid the trap of comparing the real income tax that we now know with
an ideal consumption tax that we might imagine. Consumption taxes, just like
income taxes, inevitably will be subject to the same kinds of political pressure
The paradigm of a slightly hump-shaped consumption curve over
time, however, obviously depends on allocating early-life expendi-
tures of children to their parents. You would see quite different con-
sumption-age curves if early-life expenditures "belong to" the child
rather than to the parents. Who is the consumer when the hospital
presents its bill to the new parents, the infant or the parents? Is the
difference between college and day care one of kind or merely of
degree? 102 In sum, does a new taxpayer come into being under a
consumption tax earlier than under an income tax? If not, why not?
Scholars typically focus on eliminating impediments to saving for
consumption later in life.103 Think of a couple who wants to put
away a little bit each year in order to finance that larger house, their
kids' college education, their parents' old age, and their own old
age. 04 If people's earning and spending patterns fit this paradigm,
the pure consumption tax model might be "fairer" than the income
tax model, which taxes investment income when earned. By contrast,
if we allocate costs of raising a child to that child, we would front-
load many expenditures. While studies do discuss expenditures of va-
rious age groups, few have focused on how to allocate expenses of
children between the child and the parents. 10 5 Most notably, Franco
Modigliani and Laurence Kotlikoff debated whether to adopt an age
cutoff (such as eighteen), or instead to assign consumption between
parent and child based on custom (including parental expenditures
for favored or punitive treatment of one sort or another.
Id. See discussion of the consumption tax treatment of education expenditures in part
I.E.
102. I am sure many parents have long harbored notions of keeping tabs on the
financial burden their child has imposed, to present to a now-rebellious teenager. A study
10 years ago calculated that a family of four (with the mother working part-time) spends
$82,400 to raise each child to 18, and $100,000 if you add in a public college. Longman,
supra note 38, at 80 (study by Thomas Espenshade, for the Urban Institute (figures are
in 1981 dollars)).
103. See, e.g., JOHN B. SHOVEN, RETURN ON INVESTMENT: PENSIONS ARE How
AMERICA SAVES 56 (1991); Albert Ando & Franco Modigliani, The "Life Cycle" Hy-
pothesis of Saving: Aggregate Implications and Tests, 53 AMi. ECON. REV. 55 (1963);
Kotlikoff, supra note 50; Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-
Consumption Tax, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1145 (1992); Lawrence H. Summers, Capital Taxa-
tion and Accumulation in a Life Cycle Growth Model, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 533 (1981).
104. See James J. Heckman, A Life-Cycle Model of Earnings, Learning, and Con-
sumption, 84 J. POL. ECON. Sll, 531-532 n.15 (1976) (citations omitted) ("[D]ata re-
veal that family consumption tends to peak and decline after the head reaches the early
fifties .... If children are more goods intensive as they age, as seems plausible, cross-
section peaks in consumption . can be explained by the variables family size and age
of children. .... ).
105. See, e.g., Daniel T. Slesnick, Gaining Ground: Poverty in the Postwar United
States, 101 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1993). Prior to the 1980s, the Bureau of Labor Statistic's
Consumer Expenditure Survey treated expenditures of college students as expenditures of
their parents. Id. at 7 n.10. Over one-third of dissavers fell into the 16-24 age group in
the 1980s, suggesting that this group has access to credit. Id. at 31-33.
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for a child's college tuition). 108 The fact that a large tax bill for
young people would not be popular suggests that Congress, should it
adopt a consumption tax, would at worst track the dependency de-
duction for allocating consumption.
D. Annual vs. Lifetime Measures of Income
For a government program that provides different levels of benefit
depending on financial need (such as student aid), fair use of govern-
ment resources depends on our ability to separate the needy from the
non-needy. We face similar problems on a broader scale - which we
handle no better - in our tax system. As we search for rules that
identify an individual's financial well-being, separating one person
from another is only the first step. In applying "horizontal" equity
(that is, identifying taxpayers in similar situations) and "vertical eq-
uity" (that is, identifying taxpayers in different situations), we often
fail to recognize that the same individual passes through several
stages of ability to pay tax in his lifetime.
For good reasons, we have an annual accounting and tax collection
system.10 7 But we also impose a progressive rate scale on annual in-
come in order to achieve vertical equity, on the theory that those
with increasing incomes have increasing abilities to pay. Because of
the life cycle pattern of income, a taxpayer will likely face lower
marginal tax rates early in her career and higher ones later.'08 Thus,
a young or old middle-class individual might appear to have the
same ability to pay as a forty-five-year-old low-income individual. Is
it fairer instead to look beyond our annual fiction to a concept of
"lifetime ability to pay"? 0 9 Ideally, we might have an income tax
106. Compare Kotlikoff, supra note 99, at 47 (describing work with Lawrence J.
Summers that "treats all payments, either in cash or in kind (including tuition pay-
ments), received from parents by children above age 18 as an intergenerational transfer.
Support of children prior to age 18 is considered consumption by the parent.") with
Modigliani, supra note 50, at 31 ("And why should the line ... not include all expendi-
ture on children? ... I submit that no customary expenditure on dependents [regardless
of their ages] should be treated as a transfer.").
107. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931) ("It is the essence
of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue ascertainable, and payable to
the government, at regular intervals.").
108. We should not forget that for many taxpayers, payroll taxes take a larger bite
than income taxes. See, e.g., Brazaitis & Washington, supra note 28, at C1 ("[W]hen
the employer's share of Social Security tax is counted, 90% of workers under 30 already
pay more in FICA taxes than in income taxes."). Thus, our tax system as a whole is less
progressive than just our income tax, although the disproportionate distribution of Social
Security retirement benefits to formerly lower-income workers somewhat offsets this.
109. Congress used to provide a mechanism for "income averaging" over a multi-
whose period equals the taxpayer's lifetime - wait until the tax-
payer dies, tote up all of the income and all of the allowable ex-
penses, throw in an interest factor if you want,110 and collect the
right amount of tax from the estate."'
While totally impractical and intrusive, a deathbed lookback
would enable policymakers to resist granting tax deductions for per-
sonal expenditures that disproportionately burden ability to pay in a
particular year, such as extraordinary medical expenses. Current law
poorly distinguishes between those personal deductions allowed be-
cause they properly measure income and those deductions allowed
because the public views it as unfair to extract tax from someone
incurring certain "nondiscretionary" expenditures at a particular
time in the taxpayer's life." 2
As a narrow example of the use of rates, why do we allow a credit
for child care expenses?11 3 It could be argued that without this ex-
penditure, the second spouse could not reenter the job market, and
year period, but the 1986 Tax Reform Act swept this away on the theory that substan-
tially flat rates made "bunching" of income less distortional. Prior to the repeal, Con-
gress found itself enacting ever stricter rules to prevent newly minted college graduates
from claiming the benefits of the technique by including their low-income school years in
the base period. See generally Richard Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty
Years: A Failed Experiment in Horizontal Equity, 1984 DUKE L.J. 509.
110. Cf. I.R.C. § 7519 (required payment for certain partnerships and S corpora-
tions operating under taxable years that excessively defer income).
111. Cf. Sanford & Brooks, 282 U.S. at 365 (the vagaries of annual income or
loss afford no reason "for postponing the assessment of the tax until the end of a lifetime,
or for some other indefinite period, to ascertain more precisely whether the final outcome
of the period, or of a given transaction, will be a gain or a loss"). For the conditions
under which an income tax collected at death is the same as a consumption tax, see
Graetz, supra note 94; see also Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax be Fairer
Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1101-12 (1980). For the difficulties of calcu-
lating the proper accrual of income over a lifetime of uncertain changes in asset value,
see Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99
YALE L.J. 1817 (1990) and David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Propo-
sal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1111 (1986).
112. Compare William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax,
86 HARV. L. REv. 309, 334 (1972) (asserting that because the taxpayer is no better off
than if he had been healthy all along, income earned to pay medical expenses should not
be viewed as income at all) with Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited Why
They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far From
Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REv. 831, 865-71 (1979) (disagreeing, on the ground that we
all have different circumstances, and it is difficult to say when an expense restores us to
some ideal level of health and when it represents an element of consumption).
113. Internal Revenue Code section 21 allows single persons and married couples
(generally, only where both spouses are employed) a non-refundable tax credit on child
care expenditures of up to $2,400 for one dependent ($4,800 for two or more). Many of
the costs of child care currently escape the market, but as more women enter the labor
market they leave fewer behind to provide informal care. Rachel Connelly, The Effect of
Child Care Costs on Married Women's Labor Force Participation, 74 Rav. ECON. &
STAT. 83, 90 & n.17 (1992) ("We have already seen a decline in relative care and an
increase in center based care from 1977 to 1985 . . ").
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so child care properly qualifies as a cost of doing business." 4 How-
ever, the credit phases down (but is not eliminated) for higher in-
come levels.' 1 5 Thus, Congress currently does not view child care
costs purely as affecting the question of income, but rather more as a
question of rate (although it is debatable how progressive this credit
is)." 6 Congress does not think it is fair that middle-income working
parents with child care expenses should pay for those expenses out of
after-tax income." 7 But over their lifetimes, the young, middle-in-
come parents could turn out to have been quite successful income-
earners after all. If they cannot afford the full costs of child care,
then who can?" 8
The distortion created by our annual accounting system cannot be
overstated. Looking at tax return filings, we can say with assurance
that a particular class of "low-income" taxpayers - those earning
$10,000, say - are not homogeneously "poor.""' 9 Lurking in that
114. Indeed, this was the stated rationale. Note that, except for students and inca-
pacitated parents, the credit cannot exceed the income earned by the spouse with the
lower income. I.R.C. § 21(d).
115. The credit equals 30% of employment-related child-care expenses for those
with adjusted gross income (AGI) of up to $10,000; it phases down to 20% percent at
AGI of $28,000. Id. § 21.
116. See PECHMAN, supra note 68, at 97 ("In practice, the child care credit is not
very helpful to low-income people, because families at these levels cannot afford such
outlays. In 1984 two-thirds of the $2.6 billion deducted as a child care credit was re-
ported by taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of more than $20,000.").
117. Indeed, because our income tax system does not impute income from self-
supplied labor, it generally subsidizes families having a member who does not work for
someone else. Compare, for example, Mother A who earns $20,000 from work as a travel
agent. She incurs day care expenses for her infant of $400 a week for 50 weeks, for a
total annual expense of $20,000. Mother B does not participate in the labor force, but
rather stays home for a year to care for her infant. Each mother brings in the same net
economic benefit to the household that year ($0). However, ignoring the child care
credit, A must pay income tax on her earnings. (Notice, too, that so must the person
hired by A to care for her infant.) The child care credit helps rectify the nontaxation of
self-performed services. Women in jobs with little potential for advancement generally
compare only current income and expenses. If, however, A in my example were on a
professional track, she might be making a sound economic decision to spend her entire
current income on child care even in the absence of a credit under the view that her
additional income tax constitutes an investment in not interrupting her career. See Mc-
Caffery, supra note 68, at 1023 n.156.
118. As with so many other tax exclusions for employer-provided benefits, mothers
who are professionals are also more likely than production and service workers to be
offered child care benefits, particularly pretax spending accounts (the so-called "cafeteria
plans" under Internal Revenue Code section 125). Beth Miller, The Distribution of
Family Oriented Benefits, 130 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INST. IssuE BRIEF 1 (1992).
119. Every year the Internal Revenue Service reports on filers who declare income
of $200,000 but, because of deductions, credits and tax-exempt bond interest, no tax
liability. While such stories make dramatic reading, the numbers are small. For 1990,
group, for example, is a significant number of young people just
starting their working lives, as well as many comfortable elderly, liv-
ing off savings.120 No doubt without meaning to, "a progressive an-
nual tax structure generates heavier burdens on individuals with
more humped lifetime income profiles, all else equal.""2
Economists and the popular press publicly slugged out this "an-
nual versus lifetime" income debate during a recent examination of
who won and who lost from the Reagan tax policies. 122 Distribu-
tional analysis - usually conducted to study who bears the burden
of tax changes - presents two types of difficulties. First, our defini-
tion of taxable income (and therefore tax return data) fails to cap-
ture all financial resources. 23 (In this respect, at least, the current
student aid financial-needs tests might be ahead of the tax system,
because these tests look to some nontaxable sources of income as
well as taxable income in assessing the borrower's or family's re-
sources.) 24 Second, the annual accounting system fails to properly
identify "income mobility," the movement of the same individuals up
the figure was 779 couples or individuals (earning a total of $340 million), which repre-
sented one-tenth of one percent of taxpayers at that income level; an additional 8020
returns paid tax at less than a 5% effective tax rate; and 15,246 paid tax at a 5-10%
effective rate. See More Rich Americans Escape Tax, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 1993, § 1, at
4.
120. Retirees might own their own houses, receive nontaxable Social Security pay-
ments, and enjoy Medicare benefits. For example, in 1990 "60 percent of U.S. house-
holds headed by individuals aged 65 to 74 owned their own homes without a mortgage,"
compared with 24% of the entire population. Wiatrowskd, supra note 99, at 27. See
generally FULLERTON & ROGERS, supra note 99, at 18, 26 (based on a theoretical redefi-
nition of income, "only 21.1 percent of individuals in our sample are in the same annual
and lifetime income deciles [one-tenth of the population], and only 46.1 percent are
within plus-or-minus one of the same decile").
121. FULLERTON & ROGERS, supra note 99, at 19.
122. For a sample of the recent salvos, see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXA-
TION, PUB. No. JCS-7-93, METHODOLOGY AND ISSUES IN MEASURING CHANGES IN THE
DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS (Joint Comm. Print 1993); Paul R. Krugman, The
Right, The Rich, and the Facts: Deconstructing the Income Distribution Debate, 11 AM.
PROSPECT 19, 29 (1992); Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Household In-
come Mobility During the 1980's: A Statistical Assessment Based on Tax Return Data,
June 1, 1992, at n.10, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File as 92 TNT
113-1; Sylvia Nasar, The 1980's: A Very Good Time for the Very Rich, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 1992, at Al.
123. See, e.g., Feenberg & Poterba, supra note 74, at 147 ("For studying the dis-
tribution of incomes below the top tier, tax returns are not the best source of information.
Not all low-income households file tax returns, and even for those who do, tax returns do
not include information on most transfer payments."). In preparing tax distributional
analyses, estimators routinely add certain nontaxable items back into the base. See JOINT
Comm., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 58; STAFF OF WAYS AND
MEANS COMM., 102d Cong., 2d Sess., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS (Comm.
Print 1992); cf. Slesnick, supra note 105, at 19, 30-31 (because of in-kind benefits such
as housing subsidies and health care, consumption-based poverty rates are much lower
thani income-based poverty rates; additionally, about 40% of the "income poor" are
homeowners, compared with 60% for the entire sample, and most poor enjoy significant
"service flows" from other consumer durables).
124. See part II.B.
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and down the income distribution spectrum over the years. 125
The life cycle of income phenomenon teaches us that early dis-
saving will likely be outweighed by future earning - or it would, if
only young people had the money to dissave. Indeed, in its purest
form, an investment in human capital through full-time postsecon-
dary schooling can require foregoing all current income.'26 In sum,
for most students it is a problem of timing.
E. Tax Treatment of Education Expenses
1. Economic and Tax Treatment of Education
Aside from direct government aid, whether through grants or
loans, our tax system also affects a student's (or family's) financial
decision to invest in a college education. Surprisingly, perhaps, we
find that our current tax rules disfavor expenditures for most formal
higher education. A tax system will induce economic distortions if it
fails to treat economically equivalent transactions equivalently; in
this case, we focus on two comparisons:
a The treatment of an investment in human capital and an investment in
physical or financial capital.
* The treatment of education purchased out of savings (that is, out of past
reduced consumption) and education purchased with borrowed funds (that
is, out of future reduced consumption).
To illustrate the rules to follow, let's use an example. For simplic-
ity, assume a two-period model: Sam wants to go to college for only
one year, and Sam will thereafter work for only one year. The cost
of tuition, books and fees will be $10,000, payable on the date of
enrollment. Of course, Sam also will have living expenses, but he
would anyway; by the same token, Sam would otherwise have earned
income during the period he attends school. For now, ignore these
nondeductible living expenses and the untaxed forgone income. Sam
figures that he would have earned $20,000 a year just with his high
125. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 171 (1962)
(describing this "kind of inequality [as] a sign of dynamic change, social mobility, equal-
ity of opportunity"); Gene Steuerle, Income Mobility, 56 TAx NOTES 1369, 1369 (1992)
([T]he ...studies remind us forcefully of just how weak are annual measures of in-
come. . . .If we use a one-day accounting period, for instance, most of us are probably
in the ranks of the poor on Sundays. . .while we appear rich on those lucky days when
• . . a substantial check comes in the mail").
126. Moreover, a student may even jeopardize the "investment" by working too
many hours during the school term. See discussion of forgone income as a cost of educa-
tion infra Part I.E.1(a).
school diploma, and that he will earn an additional $12,000 a year
with his college degree. That is, in year two Sam expects a twenty
percent rate of return on his direct $10,000 investment made in year
one.
a. Cost recovery
Even before we ask where he is getting the money from to finance
his education, let us ask whether the tax rules produce a fair deal for
Sam. While an investment in physical capital generally gives rise to
an asset whose cost may be recovered over its useful life through tax
deductions, no such amortizable asset results under current law from
human capital investments.121 As a general rule, taxpayers cannot
deduct personal living expenses."2 ' Any hope for a deduction for edu-
cation rests with section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
allows deductions for business expenses. For all intents and purposes,
however, we can fairly assume that the Internal Revenue Service
will not allow a deduction for pre-employment expenses for educa-
tion and training. 29 Nevertheless, as Professor Paul Stephan puts it:
"It is man's tragic fate that a finite life bounds human capital, and
our system normally makes allowances for wasting assets.' 30 A
straight-line amortization of a college education over, say, a forty-
year expected working life might fail to match income to expense
accurately,' 5 ' but it does a better job than denying cost recovery en-
tirely. Many economists and scholars have called for legislative
change to conform the tax treatment of human and nonhuman in-
vestment by allowing some sort of cost recovery deduction for invest-
ments in education.1 3
2
127. Unless you are talking about an investment in someone else's human capital.
See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 62, at 1361 ("The market in baseball player contracts, for
example, works as most markets do."); see also Selig v. United States, 740 F.2d 572 (7th
Cir. 1974); cf. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GuCCI
GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 26
(1987) (quoting Senator and former National Basketball Association star Bill Bradley)
("Mr. President [Reagan], you came to this [tax reform] because you were an actor who
paid at the 90-percent rate. . . . I came to this because I was a depreciable asset.").
128. I.R.C. § 262(a). The return on the personal or social aspect of education in-
cludes numerous psychic benefits, such as enhanced prestige, heightened intellectual
pleasure, and good citizenship.
129. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (as amended in 1967).
130. Stephan, supra note 62, at 1371.
131. Those scholars who object to creating a deduction for costs of college educa-
tion properly observe that the enhanced future income stream bears no necessary rela-
tionship to the out-of-pocket expenses of a particular student. See, e.g., John K.
McNulty, Tax Policy and Tuition Tax Credit Legislation: Federal Income Tax Al-
lowances for Personal Costs of Higher Education, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1, 30-32 (discussing
the difficulties of tying a cost recovery deduction for education costs to type and timing
of income earned).
132. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 52, at 13 ("Although . . . it is obvious that
human capital, like other forms of reproducible capital, depreciates, becomes obsolete,
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The matter is not so simple, however. To adopt a proper economic
approach, we would have to establish that the student's expenditures
for college education should be treated like any other investment in
an asset that will produce future income. Because of the "diploma
premium" discussed above, at least a portion of the costs of higher
education qualify as investment.' This does not establish, however,
that any particular cost can properly be assigned to the investment
component of an education. Many of the inputs to human capital
escape tax, such as subsidized tuition at a state college. A major
untaxed input comes from a student's forgone earnings during the
period he or she is in school."'3 On the other hand, the current regu-
lation's disallowance for minimum education requirements exceeds
even a disallowance for the personal elements of a college educa-
tion."3 5 Thus, for example, if half of the inputs to an education es-
cape tax and half of the benefits of college are enhanced present or
and entails maintenance, our tax laws are all but blind on these matters."). Professor
Schultz's comment on maintenance is not true - Treasury Regulation section 1.162-5
(as amended in 1967) does permit on-the-job training costs or other continuing education
costs to be deducted as business expenses. See also BRADFORD, supra note 3, at 205.
Most recently, see David S. Davenport, Education and Human Capital: Pursuing an
Ideal Income Tax and a Sensible Tax Policy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 793 (1992) and
Loretta C. Argrett, Tax Treatment of Higher Education Expenditures: An Unfair In-
vestment Disincentive, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 621 (1990).
133. Schultz, supra note 52, at 8. Because the mixed investment-consumption fea-
ture of education makes it difficult to apply the cost method of estimating the amount of
an investment in human capital, the alternative yield method works better: "In principle,
the value of the investment can be determined by discounting the additional future earn-
ings it yields just as the value of a physical capital good can be determined by discount-
ing its income stream." Id. at 8 & n.5.
134. See, e.g., id. at 11 ("In the United States, for example, well over half of the
costs of higher education consists of income foregone by students."). The fact that a
young person's forgone pretax income is generally low explains why young people can
"afford" to make investments in time-intensive education in the first place. GARY S.
BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 100-01 (2d ed. 1975). The progressive rate structure, among
other features, led Professor Stephan to conclude that our current income tax system
does not much disfavor investments in human capital as compared with physical capital,
because the forgone income that should properly be taxed and the out-of-pocket tuition
that should be deductible offset each other. However, he observed that a taxpayer might
want it the other way around: "If acquisition of human capital normally takes place in
earlier years when total earning power is low, and its amortization occurs in later, high
earning years, then the tax savings of the exclusion might be small and the loss of amor-
tization deductions might be costly." Stephan, supra note 62, at 1371.
135. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 216 (3d ed. 1980) (assuming "the cost of educational inputs
is divided equally between earnings and psychic income-generating investment. . ..
[and] both yield equal returns, the income stream (monetary and imputed) would be
doubled"); see also Schultz, supra note 52, at 13 ("If one were to allocate a substantial
fraction of the total costs of this education to consumption, say one-half, this would, of
future enjoyment of life, how do we "stack" the taxed and untaxed
amounts between deductible and nondeductible costs? Just to sim-
plify the discussion, I assume that the out-of-pocket costs of tuition,
fees and books can be properly viewed as spent for investment, and
the untaxed inputs are spent on consumption, but other allocations
might more clearly reflect income.
136
Without any deduction for cost recovery, then, is Sam's rate of
return really twenty percent ($12,000 income minus $10,000 invest-
ment)? Let us say that instead of going to college he bought an asset
which he sells for $12,000 at the end of year two. The tax treatment
of that transaction exhibits one crucial difference with an investment
in education: Sam's $10,000 basis in the asset will not be taxed to
him again. He thus pays tax on $20,000 from wages and $2,000 in-
vestment profit ($12,000 minus $10,000). By contrast, when Sam
earns $32,000 from his higher salary, he pays tax on the entire
$32,000. He is taxed on the return of his investment, not just on the
return on his investment. By going to college, assuming a thirty per-
cent income tax rate, Sam pays $3,600 on the additional $12,000
salary - a negative return on his investment. He would have been
better off in year two just earning a $20,000 salary with his high
school diploma.
We can use the investment analysis just described to understand
the circumstances under which it is fair to require students (or their
families) 137 to repay government subsidies for education. As Profes-
sor Bradford says, "Unless the tax system results in the govern-
ment's sharing equally in the cost and the return, it will affect the
profitability of such investments." 138 If, for example, the federal gov-
ernment paid for Sam's education, he is fairly taxed on the entire
$12,000 return because his basis in his investment is zero. This is
indeed the tax result for those who receive tuition scholajrships, 139 or,
indeed, for those who attend public elementary and secondary
course, double the observed rate of return .... A change in allocation only alters the
rate of return, not the total return.").
136. As noted in footnote 134, supra, Professor Stephan is not much troubled by
deduction disallowance, because the untaxed forgone income and the nondeductible tui-
tion offset; however, this method of allocation no more clearly reflects income than a full
deduction. In no event, though, should the student's living expenses qualify as invest-
ment. See Theodore W. Schultz, Capital Formation by Education, 68 J. POL. EcON. 571,
573 (1960).
137. Were parents to pay for the child's education, see supra part .C for a discus-
sion of whose cost recovery expenditures these would be. Cf. Davenport, supra note 132,
at 820-21 n.66 (suggesting that where the parent would otherwise have paid for the
education, a cost recovery deduction be calculated at the parent's (higher) tax rate, "as is
done with the 'kiddie tax' ").
138. BRADFORD, supra note 3, at 205 (the government shares in the cost of educa-
tion when the student finances it through fewer hours worked, because of the lost tax on
the forgone wages).
139. See generally Charlotte Crane, Scholarships and the Federal Income Tax
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schools (although the reason usually given is that lower education
produces primarily social returns).1 40 Presumably, if we allowed cost
recovery deductions for education, the graduate's amortizable basis
would include only out-of-pocket costs, and not untaxed inputs such
as grants, scholarships, reduced tuition, or forgone income. Because
an exclusion from income generally has the same tax effect as an
inclusion accompanied by an immediate deduction, 41 this model ac-
tually accelerates the benefit to the graduate. However, taxing these
inputs without allowing any cost recovery deduction for appropriate
costs would expand the amount of mismeasured human capital in-
vestment. The most accurate result is one that matches the amorti-
zation of education costs to the projected income stream. This
accuracy could be attempted only by imputing to Sam the costs of
government-provided education and allowing him to recover the im-
puted amount over time.
What would be the tax treatment of college expenses if instead we
had a consumption tax instead of an income tax? Many consumption
tax proposals include exemptions for such "necessities" as food,
clothing, housing, and medical expenditures.' Surprisingly, there is
little academic discussion of how to treat education in a consumption
tax.143 Again, if we view education as consumption, educational ex-
penditures would not reduce the tax base. However, if education
qualifies as investment, then the expenditure would be immediately
expensed.
A consumption tax that provides no deduction for college educa-
tion costs suffers from an additional problem. The expenditure of the
amounts (and we can be talking about very large amounts) will be
Base, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63 (1991); Joseph M. Dodge, Scholarships Under the In-
come Tax, 46 TAx LAW. 697 (1993).
140. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 125, at 86-98 (of course, Friedman expresses
skepticism of even the benefits of collectively producing good citizens). But see BECKER,
supra note 134, at 201-05 (comparing personal and social rates of return to a high school
education).
141. Nothing is simple anymore. The 1986 Tax Reform Act imposed a "2-percent
floor" on miscellaneous employee business expenses. I.R.C. § 67. If attending school is
viewed as an expense of future employment, then the amortization deductions would
come under this floor.
142. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 101, at 1441.
143. For the fullest treatment, see Stephan, supra note 62, at 1375. See generally
BRADFORD, supra note 3, at Tbl. 14-1 (setting forth the alternatives of education costs in
a "limited-exemption" consumption tax base or a "liberal-exemption" base; the differ-
ence in 1981 dollars is $29.3 billion annually for the aggregate category "private educa-
tion and research"). See also Heckman, supra note 104.
subject to current tax in the year spent. And if we retain a progres-
sive rate structure, an expenditure this size is likely to tip the student
into the highest bracket! This is a problem of, as Professor Bradford
puts it, "lumpiness. 144
Moreover, a consumption tax does not care where the taxpayer
gets the money from to spend on consumption. The money could
come out of earned income. It could come out of returns on invest-
ment or out of savings. And, what may be taken as a nasty surprise,
the money could come from borrowing.145 (Gifts and inheritances
present an additional layer of issues, with no consensus by the schol-
ars.) For a similar "lumpy" nondeductible expenditure - the
purchase of a home - Professor Bradford offers the possibility of
excluding the mortgage borrowing (and repayments) from the con-
sumption tax base. 146 A similar mechanism could be adopted for stu-
dent loans. However, unless we also adopt a general averaging
device, we might then produce a more favorable result for borrowing
than for tuition paid out of savings (or current income).
b. Interest
The other substantive issue in the taxation of education is the tim-
ing of the expenditure. Sam will be subject to the same tax treat-
ment for his investment (after conforming the cost recovery rules)
only if he comes out the same by paying for his college education
with cash on the barrelhead (i.e., from money already saved) or by
repaying student loans (i.e., from money to be saved in the future).
144. See BRADFORD, supra note 3, at 85-86 (discussing mortgages).
145. During the lead up to the 1986 tax reform, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan
told his Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Ron Pearlman: "The next time you go to a
cocktail party, you ask people what they think of a tax system in which borrowings are
treated like income. They're going to tell you you're crazy." BIRNBAUM & MURRAY,
supra note 127, at 52; see also William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1154 (1974) ("Inclusion of loan proceeds
in income would not ordinarily require large tax payments in the year of a loan, because
normally such loans are to pay for capital investment that would be immediately deducti-
ble under a consumption-type tax."). The overtaxation problem does not show up so
clearly under our current income tax - not because college tuition is deductible but
because the tax liability is masked by being matched to the repayment term of the loan.
That is, after the student enters the workforce and begins to repay the loan, he makes
each payment with income taxed to him that year.
146. BRADFORD, supra note 3, at 85-86. Bradford explains:
Two methods are available to alleviate the tax consequences of applying
graduated rates to such wide swings in the tax base. Some form of tax base
averaging . . . may be introduced. Or special allowance may be provided for
tax-prepaid treatment of mortgage borrowing (no inclusion of proceeds, no de-
duction for repayments of principal or interest). In addition, limited tax-pre-
paid savings might be allowed (for example, a special homeowner's saving plan,
with no deduction for amounts put aside but no taxation of the returns or of
any withdrawals from the plan).
Id. at 86.
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However, our current income tax does not produce parity here. 47
First, assume Sam saved $10,000 prior to going to school. This
amount has already borne tax. By spending the funds on schooling,
Sam loses the ability to earn a return on an alternative investment of
the funds. We properly measure this opportunity cost after tax. That
is, if Sam had instead bought a T-bill bearing a ten percent return,
his $1,000 return would have been taxed to him. Assume a thirty
percent tax rate, Sam would have $700 cash after one year if he
didn't go to college. Thus, by going to college, Sam gave up the abil-
ity to consume an additional $700. If instead Sam borrows the
funds, at a ten percent interest rate, he will have to repay the loan
plus interest. Again, the income he earns to repay the $10,000 prin-
cipal will be subject to tax. However, so will the income he earns to
pay the interest, because, after the 1986 Tax Reform Act, interest
paid on consumer loans (including education loans) cannot be de-
ducted."4 If he could have deducted the $1,000 interest payment he
would have saved $300 in taxes on the income earned to finance the
interest repayment, and thus would have lost the ability to consume
only $700. By being denied the deduction, Sam's future consumption
is reduced by the full $1,000.
The denial of an interest deduction distorts the choice between
spending out of prior saving or spending out of future saving. 4 '
Where the interest payment cannot be deducted, 50 we reward tax-
payers who save first, spend later.
Unfortunately, this is not the end of the story. We do allow a
home mortgage interest deduction, and, of course, money is fungible.
Thus, we now live under the absurd and terribly unfair regime that a
taxpayer who owns a home can generally deduct interest paid on a
"home equity loan" - regardless of what he does with the pro-
ceeds.' 5' Meanwhile, his renting counterpart must borrow for these
147. The following example is based on Louis A. TALLEY & BOB LYKE, CONGRES-
SIONAL RES. SERV., PUB. No. 92-2782, TAX ALLOWANCE FOR INTEREST PAYMENTS ON
EDUCATIONAL LOANS: DATA AND DISCUSSION OF ISSUES (1992), available in LEXIS,
FEDTAX Library, TNT File as 92 TNT 71-20.
148. I.R.C. § 163(h).
149. This is as true for expenditures on consumption as for business expenditures;
the real distortion under our income tax system is that we do not impute income from the
services flows of houses and other consumer durables.
150. Subsidized interest rates offered under a government program of general
availability do not result in taxable income to the borrower. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-
5T(b)(5) (1986). This is equivalent to including the forgone bargain interest in the bor-
rower's income and allowing an offsetting deduction.
151. While Internal Revenue Code section 163(h)(3)(C) places a $100,000 cap on
qualifying home equity debt, this amount would cover four years of expenses (including
expenses on an after-tax basis. Precise figures are not available, but
estimates of home equity borrowing for education range from ten to
fifty percent of total home equity loans. 152
Instead of conforming the tax treatment of current and future re-
duced consumption by granting an interest deduction, we could con-
form the treatment by excluding Sam's interest earned from income
and retaining deduction disallowance. This would give him the
choice between $1,000 cash now or later. This is what happens under
a consumption tax: it excludes all investment returns from income,
and denies all deductions for interest.
2. Proposals for Legislative Change
In every Congress we see proposals for reforming the tax treat-
ment of education expenditures. We already have an interest exclu-
sion for Education Savings Bonds. 1 3 One type of proposal would
restore the interest deduction for education loans.15 4 Another type of
living expenses) at nearly all schools. See also TALLEY & LYKE, supra note 147, at n.17
("From the standpoint of need-based student aid, the deductibility of home equity loans
used for educational expenses is difficult to justify."). Incidently, the likely borrower
(that is, the homeowner) is the student's parents, who get more bang out of the interest
deduction both by being more likely to itemize deductions in the first place and by being
in a higher tax bracket.
152. Compare LANA CHANDLER & MICHAEL D. BoGGs, THE STUDENT LOAN
HANDBOOK 38 (1990) (about 50% of home equity loans go to parents financing their
children's education) with GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuB. No. GAO/HRD-93-IR,
NONFEDERAL STUDENT LOANS, at 3, 7 (1992) (banking industry studies conservatively
estimate that 10% of home equity loans are taken out for education, totaling about $2.4
billion in 1991, and, further, the average annual income of home equity borrowers ex-
ceeds $30,000).
153. I.R.C. § 135, added by the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 (1988), excludes from income the proceeds of
U.S. savings bonds up to the amount of higher education tuition and fees paid that year
for the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, or a dependent; the exclusion phases out for
higher income taxpayers. See also H.R. 11, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (vetoed Nov. 5, 1992)
(would have eliminated the dependency and other requirements, and removed the income
phaseout).
154. See, e.g., H.R. 1667, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (allowing either a deduc-
tion or a nonrefundable credit (for nonitemizers) for interestpaid on qualified education
loans; the credit would generally equal 15% of the interest, up to a maximum annual
credit of $300); see also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF
MISCELLANEOUS TAX PROPOSALS SCHEDULED FOR HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMIT-
TEE ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES OF THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE
(1993).
Now that Congress has adopted President Clinton's student loan reforms (discussed in
part II.C), it would have to specify, should it restore an interest deduction for student
loans, how borrowers would determine what portion of income-contingent payments rep-
resented "interest." Recently proposed and then withdrawn Treasury regulations setting
forth the tax results of "contingent interest" would, in the case of small issues, have
allowed borrowers to treat all payments made as first reducing principal and payments
thereafter as interest. Cf. Rev. Rul. 72-2, 1972-1 C.B. 19, discussed infra note 206. Any
scheme should try to deal with a current low-income graduate who can be expected to
earn high income later in the payment term.
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proposal would move towards a consumption base concept and allow
investment income to accumulate free of tax in an education account
much like an individual retirement account. 155 As already shown,
targeted income exclusions just create more distortions between edu-
cation and other "investments." I am not aware of any proposals
that would simply allow a cost recovery deduction for education ex-
penses,' 56 although to the extent that student loans are forgiven (for
national service under President Clinton's proposal *or by the schools
themselves 5 7 ) or that grants or scholarships cover the cost and no
income results to the student, it amounts to the same thing. 5
155. See, e.g., H.R. 1311, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993); Sen. Amend. 487 to H.R.
2118, § 341 (failing June 22, 1993); Higher Education Accumulation Program Act of
1994, H.R. 3897, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (proposed February 24, 1994).
156. Consider the following answer then President-elect Clinton gave to an adult
student who asked if his administration would consider making college education tax
deductible:
Well, if you send yourself to college, then . . . whether that would be a real
incentive would really depend, as a practical matter, on how much income a
person has. That is, if it was just a tax deduction and you were already in the
15 percent income tax bracket, which most Americans would be in [who]
would be going through college ... if you spend $2,000 on college, you could
deduct that from your income.
So, if you had a - let's say you had a $20,000 income, that would give you
an $18,000 income .... Would you be better off doing that, or having a dra-
matically expanded loan program which you could work off later or pay off
over 10 to 20 years as a small percentage of your income? How many would
prefer the tax deduction? (Applause.)
How many prefer the expanded loans? (Applause.)
Maybe, there's no reason we would not be able to do - make it an either or.
We might be able to give people an elective. But, I've never thought about it
before, and I can't say I'll be for it until I figure it out.
Address by President-Elect Bill Clinton at Wilbur Wright Community College, Chicago,
Illinois, supra note 26. What President Clinton does not realize is that under a nondis-
torting taxing scheme, both the interest on the debt and the outlay for education would,
at some point, be deductible. What he does realize, though, is that either of these
changes would be quite expensive. Further, like any tax deduction in our progressive
system (including those for conventional business assets), these changes appear to "bene-
fit" the middle and upper-class more than those in lower income brackets.
157. If a student loan borrower undertakes certain employment (such as providing
medical services in a rural area), Internal Revenue Code section 108(f) allows the bor-
rower to exclude from income the amount of student loans whose repayment is forgiven
by the federal or a state government. See also 139 CONG. REc. S5646, S5647-50 (1993)
(to extend section 108(f) relief to student loans forgiven by an educational institution or
other nonprofit organization in return for taking public interest or community benefit
work). See generally J. Timothy Phillips & Timothy G. Hatfield, Uncle Sam Gets the
Goldmine - Students Get the Shaft: Federal Tax Treatment of Student Loan Indebt-
edness, 15 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 249 (1991).
158. We must end our discussion of tax subsidies with a cautionary tale: do not act
before Congress grants the subsidy. The sad case of the Michigan Education Trust serves
as a testament to parental desperation in the face of ever-growing tuition projections,
PART II: GOVERNMENT AS CREDIT PROVIDER
A. The Function of Debt
We are a nation obsessed with debt. The federal debt exploded as
the issue of the 1992 presidential campaign, 19 and President Clinton
has made reducing the growth of the debt (although not the absolute
amount)160 his domestic priority. (His student loan reform package
state governments' will to please its (middle-class) constituents at the expense of the
federal government, and investment advisors' never-ending search for tax-subsidized sav-
ings vehicles. See generally Jeffrey S. Lehman, Social Irresponsibility, Actuarial As-
sumptions, and Wealth Redistribution: Lessons About Public Policy from a Prepaid
Tuition Program, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 1035 (1990).
The Michigan Education Trust ("MET"), a state-created corporation, entered into
contracts with parents to supply four years of education at a Michigan institution of
higher education when the parents' child enrolls in the future, in exchange for a payment
up front of an actuarily determined amount. Michigan v. United States, 802 F. Supp.
120 (W.D. Mich. 1992). However, Michigan did not stand behind the payoff. Therefore,
if tuition prices increased faster than MET's investment earnings, MET would be unable
to deliver on the contracts. (The governor, however, pressured state schools to hold down
their tuitions to the increases assumed by the trust's actuaries. Lehman, supra, at 1114.)
MET agreed to pay a refund only if the child dies, is denied admission to a Michigan
public institution, has reached 18 and certifies that she will not attend college, or if the
program becomes actuarily unsound.
The Internal Revenue Service ruled that neither the parents nor the child have current
income, but ruled adversely on every other tax issue. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (Mar.
29, 1988); see also Ellin Rosenthal, Tax Implications of Michigan Tuition Prepayment
Program Remain Unsettled, 39 TAx NOTEs 676 (1988). First, while the contract price
paid by the parent qualifies as a gift excluded from the child's income, the child will
recognize income when she later enrolls to the extent that the fair market value of the
educational services (or refund) exceeds her carryover basis in the contract. Second, the
trust must currently pay tax on its income, because under the facts it is not an integral
part of the state (nor does the income accrue to the state in the performance of an
essential governmental function under Internal Revenue Code section 115). Third, the
purchase price paid by the parent constitutes a completed gift qualifying for neither the
$10,000 annual gift tax exclusion (because it is a gift of a future interest) nor for the
unlimited gift tax exclusion for tuition payments (because it is made to the trust and not
to the educational institution). (Recall discussion in part I.C.2.) The district court upheld
all of these rulings, as well as the Internal Revenue Service's rejection of MET's separate
application exempt status as a charity. Michigan, 802 F. Supp. at 123 (describing MET
as a corporation for tax purposes).
In just four years, MET had paid taxes of about $29 million. Karen Pierog, Michigan
Will Appeal Decision Finding that Prepaid Tuition Is Not Tax Exempt, BOND BUYER,
Aug. 20, 1992, at 2, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, BNDBYR File. Shortly after
the court decision, however, MET ceased marketing the contracts, thus freezing the pool
at 55,000 contracts. Id.; Victor A. Babal et al., Dunce Cap for Trust Fund, CITY &
STATE, May 4, 1992, at 5, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CTY&ST File. By
spring 1993, MET's surplus had dropped from $23.5 million to $2 million, "raising ques-
tions about the viability of the controversial program." Pre-Paid Tuition: Mich. Plan's
Surplus Drops Drastically, DAILY REP. CARD, March 11, 1993, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, RPTCRD File. While a few other states adopted similar plans, Florida
maintains that, unlike Michigan, its prepaid tuition contracts are backed up by the full
faith and credit of the state, and so its trust's investment income cannot be taxed by the
federal government. See Pierog, supra.
159. This is despite the Treasury Department's Office of Domestic Finance having
for years called its softball team "Megadebt."
160. Politicians like to use the confusing terminology to suit their goals. When
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passed in Hill committees that had no better way to meet their as-
signed deficit-reduction targets. 1') At the individual level, the public
views credit cards as wicked temptation, and a credit-cardless life as
the first step toward sainthood. There is nothing, however, intrinsi-
cally evil about debt. To say that the government spends fifteen per-
cent of its budget on interest each year sounds shockingly
wasteful."6 2 But how much of our annual household budget do we
devote to mortgage interest alone?
What's the difference between good debt and bad debt? Economi-
cally, borrowing is just a question of weighing risks and rewards.
Thus, it can make sense to borrow to buy a house, to pay college
tuition, to sell short, or to finance a war. The current national debt is
a problem only if it is being used to finance current consumption at
the expense of the standard of living of the next generation.163
Unfortunately, an educational expense is of the type most difficult
to borrow for - "A student loan is a perfect example of the type of
loan that private lenders find costly: the loan is for a small amount,
there is no marketable asset that can provide collateral, and the
highly mobile borrower generally has no credit history.' 6 4 If the
government did nothing more than facilitate access to credit, at fair
market rates (as best these can be set where no market otherwise
exists), it would perform a valuable function to a cash-strapped
family.
Americans currently exhibit a range of ambivalent and inefficient
behavior patterns when it comes to borrowing for college. Distress-
ingly, those at the low end of the income range are quite reluctant to
describing the enormity of the problem, they refer to the debt, but when they want to
seem to be doing something about it they switch to the (annual) deficit.
161. See, e.g., James Jeffords, Report Card on Clinton's First 100 Days, ROLL
CALL, Apr. 19, 1993 available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ROLLCL File (the size of
the committee's target for cuts in nondiscretionary spending, meant, "[a]s Willie Sutton
might have noted, .... student loans, because that's where the money is in the Labor
Committee").
162. See, e.g., Address by President-Elect Bill Clinton at Wilbur Wright Commu-
nity College, Chicago, Illinois, supra note 26 ("[W]e are spending too much of our
money on yesterday, because our government debt is too high .... [T]he interest on
the debt is over 15 cents on the tax dollar now every year. It will soon be more than we
spend on national defense - just paying the interest on yesterday's debt.").
163. See discussion of the federal deficit in part I.B.
164. BARRY P. BOSWORTH ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL CREDIT PRO-
GRAMS 130-31 (1987).
borrow, 1' 5 even though this group would likely find the greatest per-
centage improvement in lifetime earnings from a college educa-
tion." 6' By contrast, the better off are those who are already quite
comfortable with borrowing, and, moreover, they benefit more from
tax-deductible interest under the current loophole, discussed above,
for home equity loans used to finance education (or any other con-
sumer expenditure). Finally, the most available form of unsecured
consumer credit - credit cards - has even been used to finance
higher education. This is crazy: credit cards carry the highest inter-
est rates around, and so are best employed tiding one over for short
periods, not for the many years over which a college education pro-
vides benefits.167
B. The Guaranteed Student Loan Program
Under the long-standing federal student loan program, the private
sector has provided the funds for higher education loans.168 Aside
from imposing borrowing and eligibility limits, the federal govern-
ment guarantees the student's repayment obligation in the event of
default."6 9 About $15 billion in new loans were expected to be issued
165. See, e.g., MORTENSON, supra note 41, at ii ("For any purpose, the poor are
less likely than the financially better off to be willing to assume debt."); McPherson &
Skinner, supra note 56, at 34 n.16 ("We say 'in principle' loans could handle the load
because there is evidence that in fact students from disadvantaged backgrounds are re-
luctant to borrow heavily for education, partly because their families have little experi-
ence with long-term credit (and the experience is often negative)."); see also, e.g., Jerry
Thomas, Black Colleges' Cash Woes Keep Out Cream of the Crop, C. TRIB., Nov. 9,
1992, at 1 (for one teenager "who wants to go into business and aspires to become a U.S.
Supreme Court justice, attending a black college is a closed chapter for now. She de-
clined to take out a student loan, fearing it would stall her efforts to earn her master's
and then a law degree.").
166. Cf. JOHNSTONE, supra note 45, at 150-51 n.1 ("There is absolutely no validity
to the frequent charge that income contingent lending per se constitutes a threat to stu-
dents from low-income families. These students, in fact, are by far the heaviest borrowers
now and stand to gain the most from more manageable borrowing opportunities.").
167. GERALD KREFTz, HOW TO PAY FOR YOUR CHILDREN'S COLLEGE EDUCA-
TION 101 (1988).
168. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965),
(Title IV, part B - Federal Family Education Loan program (formerly the Guaranteed
Student Loan Program)) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1071 to 1087-2 (West
1990 & Supp. 1994)); see also 34 C.F.R. § 659. Since its inception, the Federal Family
Education Loan program has supported over $130 billion in loans. H.R. REP. No. 156,
103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1993). The federal government also indirectly subsidizes
states that issue tax-exempt education bonds, via the federal exemption of interest paid
to bondholders. I.R.C. § 103(a) (interest on state and local bonds); I.R.C. § 144(b)
(qualified student loan bonds). Congress's General Accounting Office found that
nonfederal lenders (state or nonprofit programs) imposed stricter requirements than do
the federally guaranteed loan rules: the programs generally require the applicant to
demonstrate credit worthiness, and often refuse to lend to those attending proprietary
institutions, in an attempt to minimize their creditor risks. GENERAL AccOUNTING OF-
FICE, supra note 152.
169. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1087, 1091 (West Supp. 1994).
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in 1993, exploding to $18 billion in 1994.170 Defaults cost the gov-
ernment billions of dollars -a year, although studies show that the
size of the loan is less often the cause than the fact that the student
dropped out of school, thus forfeiting the higher income that usually
follows a college degree.
171
Several distinct loan programs exist, with varying levels of federal
subsidy.'72 For example, under the Stafford loan program, available
170. House Vote Raises Student Loan Hopes, FDIC WATCH, July 5, 1993, availa-
ble in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ABBB File. See generally U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL AnSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1992 tbl. no. 267, at 168 (112th ed.
1992).
171. The Office of Management and Budget estimates the federal government will
pay $2.5 billion to cover unpaid loans in fiscal year 1993, down from $2.7 billion in fiscal
year 1992 and $3.6 billion the previous year. Defaults have fallen because in 1989 Con-
gress halted lending to schools with default rates of 30% or higher. U.S. Student Loan
Default Rate Drops in FY 1991, July 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
REUFIN File. See generally Laura G. Knapp & Terry G. Seaks, An Analysis of the
Probability of Default on Federally Guaranteed Student Loans, 74 REV. ECON. &
STATS. 404 (1992). See also Joseph J. Eglin, Untangling Student Loans, Soc'y, Jan.-
Feb. 1993, at 52, 54 (The "GAO has recommended that the six-month grace period on
repayment... be eliminated for those who do not complete their programs. This would
encourage borrowers to continue their studies and, in turn, might help reduce defaults.").
The law does not require lenders to make credit checks of applicants under the age of
twenty-one. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1077(a)(2) (West Supp. 1994). However, graduate students
do not appear to be a great credit risk. See Laurence W. O'Toole, President, New Eng-
land Educ. Loan Mktg. Corp., National Student Loan Trust: A Proposal for Implemen-
tation 2 (Feb. 1993) (on file with author) ("Graduate students default at a rate less than
of 1 %."); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. PUB. No. GAO/HRD-99-138FS,
PARENT AND SUPPLEMENTAL STUDENT LOANS: VOLUME AND DEFAULT TRENDS FOR Fis-
CAL YEARS 1989 TO 1991, at 6 (1992) ("Proprietary school borrowers accounted for $1.1
billion (about 83 percent)" of defaults in unsubsidized loans to students. "Freshmen bor-
rowers at these schools were responsible for $1 billion of these defaults.").
172. The programs cost the federal government $4.6 billion in fiscal year 1991,
mostly "to cover administrative costs, subsidies, and payoffs of defaulted loans." Eglin,
supra note 171, at 53. For detailed statistics of the various federal programs, and their
cost to the federal government, see H.R_ REP. No. 156, supra note 168.
Constant renaming of the various loan programs can be confusing; readers, depending
on their ages, might recognize some of the following programs. Most subsidized are the
low-interest Perkins Loans (formerly National Defense or National Direct Student
Loans), under which institutions of higher education make direct loans out of primarily
federally-seeded revolving funds. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1087aa-1087hh (Vest 1990 & Supp.
1994); 34 C.F.R. § 674 (1993). Carrying in-school interest subsidies and somewhat sub-
sidized interest rates are the need-based Stafford Loans (formerly Guaranteed Student
Loans). 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1077-1078 (Vest 1990 & Supp. 1994). The government's costs
for both of these programs depend upon the relationship between the current rate at
which the Treasury can borrow and the statutory interest rates (for example, Stafford
loans currently charge no interest while the student is in school, 8 % during the first four
years of repayment, and 10% in the remaining six years). See, e.g., Joseph M. Cronin &
Sylvia Q. Simmons, Myths and Realities of Student Indebtedness, in STUDENT LOANS:
RISKS AND REALITIES, supra note 11, at 20; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No.
GAO/HRD-92-113, GUARANTEED STUDENT LOANS: ELIINATING INTEREST RATE
to those from needy families, the federal government pays the stu-
dent's entire interest obligations while the student is in school and
also makes "special allowance payments" to lenders throughout the
life of the loan "to raise their interest revenue to competitive
levels." 17 3 Those ineligible for subsidized loans (or parental borrow-
ers) must pay market interest rates, even while the student is in
school, although these loans still carry the federal guarantee against
default.1
7 4
Current aid-eligibility rules fail to distinguish between temporary
financial need and lifetime financial need.7 5 Moreover, the rules pro-
vide a perverse incentive for parents not to save prior to their chil-
dren's attending college in order to appear financially needy. 76
FLOORS COULD GENERATE SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS (1992). Carrying no in-school subsidy
and a generally higher interest rate (the rates are variable, and so can actually be lower
than the fixed Stafford rates) are the Parent Loans for Undergraduate Students (PLUS),
20 U.S.C.A. § 1078-2 (West Supp. 1994); the Unsubsidized Stafford Loans for Middle
Income Borrowers, for undergraduates, id. § 1078-8 (West Supp. 1994); the Supplemen-
tal Loans for Students (SLS), for independent and graduate students (previously the
Jeffords Loan Program or the Auxiliary Loan to Students (unfortunately, ALAS!)), Id.
§ 1078-1 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994) (repealed, effective July 1, 1994, by OBRA 1993,
supra note 8, § 12048(b)); and a consolidated loan program, id. § 1078-3 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1994). The Higher Education Amendments of 1992 adopted the term "Federal
Family Education Loan Program" to refer collectively to Stafford Loans, Unsubsidized
Stafford Loans, SLS, PLUS, and consolidated loan programs. Pub. L. No. 102-325, Title
IV, § 411(a)(1), 106 Stat. 448, 510 (1992); see also 34 C.F.R. pt. 682 (1993).
173. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HRD. 93-27, STUDENT
LOANS: DIRECT LOANS COULD SAVE BILLIONS IN FIRST 5 YEARS WITH PROPER IMPLE-
MENTATION 2 (1992). See generally 20 U.S.C.A. § 1087-1 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994).
174. Even the so-called "unsubsidized" loans can also enjoy a special allowance
payment, once the student is out of school, because the interest rate for both Stafford and
unsubsidized Stafford loans is capped at 8.25% (previously 9% for subsidized loans,
11 % for independent-student unsubsidized loans, and 10% for PLUS loans). OBRA
1993, supra note 8, § 455(b). The formula for setting the interest rate on Stafford loans
has been floating at the 91-day Treasury bill rate plus 3.1% of the loan - meaning that
under current low rates, 1993 interest is 6.22%. See, e.g., Jane Bryant Quinn, Changes
in Student Loans Will Aid the College-Bound, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1993, at H3. Be-
ginning July, 1995, the formula for subsidized loans drops to 2.5% over the 91-day T-bill
rate while the student is in school; and, once the loan is in repayment status (and for
unsubsidized loans), beginning July, 1998, to 1 % above the bond equivalent rate on a
security with a comparable maturity (2.1 % above the bond equivalent rate for PLUS
loans). OBRA 1993, supra note 8, § 455(b); OBRA Conference Report, supra note 32,
at 445-46.
175. Rules focus too narrowly on the current financial resources of the family. See
infra part II.E; 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1087kk-1087vv (West Supp. 1994). The snapshot ap-
proach to financial need "cannot distinguish between the frugal poor and the spend-
thrifty. It cannot distinguish between improvidence and financial hardship." McPherson
& Skinner, supra note 56, at 36 n.17 (quoting from a financial aid manual). Many par-
ents, whether out of lack of foresight or genuine high costs in raising their children, could
not finance their children's college expenses out of current income. See id. at 29
("Surveys indicate that few parents even begin to think about saving for their children's
college education until the children are well along in high school."); KREFETZ, supra note
167, at 100 ("Parents generally fall into two categories; those who have prepared to pay
college bills from the day their children were born, and the rest of us.").
176. See McPherson & Skinner, supra note 56; Aaron S. Edlin, Is College Aid
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When the federal government first got into the student loan busi-
ness in 1958, it did not subsidize the interest rate (although the gov-
ernment did pay interest while the student was in school)."' Several
years later, then-Senator Lyndon Johnson's initial student loan pro-
posal (enacted in much different form in 1965 after he became presi-
dent) provided that the program would be self-supporting (and hence
was open to all regardless of financial need) .1 8 The Higher Educa-
tion Act of 1965 offered only subsidized loans, necessitating a needs
test. Congress briefly, and disastrously, removed the needs test in the
late 1970s, inducing massive interest-rate arbitrage by high-income
parents who could not pass up the subsidized rates . 7  The recent
shift towards universal student loans "has been part of a larger
transformation .. . from a program intended mainly to ease the
cash-flow problems of non-needy families to a major source of funds
for low-income students attempting to pay for college."' 80 While this
is still true, we have to some degree returned to our roots with the
relatively new unsubsidized loan programs for higher-income
families.
C. Clinton's Student Loan Program
On March 1, 1993, President Clinton announced the parameters
of his higher education student loan proposal.'' Invoking the spirits
of the Civilian Conservation Corps, the GI Bill, and the Peace
Corps, Clinton declared that "[w]hen people give something of inval-
uable merit to their country, they ought to be rewarded with the
opportunity to further their education."'" 2 He also decried the cur-
rent structure, under which, "when students borrow money for an
education, the repayment plan they make is based largely on how
much they have to repay without regard to what the jobs they take
Equitable and Efficient?, 7 J. EcoN. PEasP. 143 (1993).
177. Morse, supra note 17, at 4. Nor did the contemporaneous state student loan
guarantee programs (in Massachusetts and New York) subsidize the rate (as distinct
from the guarantee feature). Id. at 5.
178. Id. at 12-13.
179. The generous provisions of the Middle Income Student Assistance Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-566, 92 Stat. 2402 (1978), were repealed by the Postsecondary
Student Assistance Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 532-533, 95 Stat. 450
(1981).
180. Hansen, supra note 6, at 17.
181. President Clinton, Remarks at Rutgers University, Rutgers Athletic Center,
Piscataway, New Jersey (Mar. 1, 1993), available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
FEDNEW File [hereinafter President Clinton, Remarks at Rutgers University].
182. Id.
themselves pay."' 83 He believed this structure to be "a powerful in-
centive, therefore, for young college graduates to do just the reverse
of what we might want them to do, to take a job that pays more,
even if it is less rewarding, because that is the job that will make the
repayment of the loans possible.' 1 84 Clinton subsequently sent up to
Capitol Hill two separate bills, which were introduced in Congress as
the National Service Trust Act of 1993 and the Student Loan Re-
form Act of 1993; the student loan reform proposal was folded into
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, and the national
service proposal separately passed as a free-standing bill. 8 ' While
the Administration fell short of its goal of complete direct lending, 86
the winners will still, at least in significant part, be the student
borrowers.'
87
To remedy these financial pressures on new graduates, President
Clinton proposed two novel methods of loan repayment. His national
service legislation permits young people, for one or two years, "to
work off outstanding loans or to build up credits for future education
and training opportunities."' 88 His direct lending legislation permits
183. Id.
184. Id. He continued, "It is also, unfortunately, a powerful incentive for some not
to make their payments at all, which is unforgivable." Id.
185. Congress passed the Student Loan Reform Act as Title IV of OBRA 1993,
supra note 8, and separately passed the National and Community Service Trust Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-82, 107 Stat. 785 (1993).
186. See infra part II.E.1 for a discussion of federal direct lending versus a federal
guarantee of private loans.
187. See OBRA Conference Report, supra note 32, at 445-46 (statement of the
Managers describing lower interest rates and lower caps); see also, e.g., Adam Clymer,
New U.S. Program of Student Loans Clears Key Panel, N.Y. TiNiEs, June 11, 1993, at
Al ("The most immediate saving would be to students, who now pay fees of as much as
$80 for every $1,000 borrowed. Under the bill, those fees would be cut in half, whether
the loan was coming from the Government or from a bank.").
188. President Clinton, Remarks at Rutgers University, supra note 181. This na-
tional-service aspect of Clinton's proposal has, understandably, attracted the lion's share
of public and media attention. After arm-twisting by the military - which has "found
that money for school is the most common reason cited for joining the military" - the
White House reduced the maximum annual amount a student could earn towards college
expenses from $6,500 to $5,000. National Service Plan Shouldn't Hurt Military
Recruiting, Says Montgomery, Apr. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
PRNEWS File ("Parity between these two programs would have denigrated the service
and sacrifice of those who wear the uniform."). Public sector unions fear displacement by
underpaid "volunteers." See, e.g., Aaron Bernstein, New Schools of Thought on Paying
for College, Bus. WK., Oct. 12, 1992, at 58; see also, e.g., Bruce Chapman, Pass Na-
tional Service, Cripple Charity, WALL. ST. J., May 24, 1993, at A10, A10 ("[I]f your
charity, like the great majority, is not chosen [to participate in the national service pro-
gram], your cause will find itself trying to compete with the federal treasury."); Gary S.
Becker, Clinton's Student-Loan Plan Deserves an 'F', Bus. WK., June 14, 1993, at 18, 18
("The President's plan sends a dubious message to young people. . . .that it is more
beneficial to spend time helping to build housing for the homeless. . . than to contribute
to the productivity of the U.S. economy by becoming better engineers, computer pro-
grammers, architects, etc."); see also D. Bruce Johnstone, A Pipe-Dream Peace Corps,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 5, 1993, at 46, 46. Johnstone writes:
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borrowers to "pay [college loans] back as a small percentage of their
own income over time."' 89 A graduate may elect income-contingent
repayment from a variety of proposed repayment methods; 190 addi-
tionally, upon default, a loan in repayment under another mecha-
nism converts automatically into an income-contingent loan.191
However, Clinton's proposal retained, for each type of loan, "the
terms, conditions, and benefits of its corresponding guaranteed
loan"; 9 s thus, those currently eligible for interest rate subsidies
would continue to qualify for them.
National service is actually a very costly way to get a relatively small number
of young people in and out of college - considerably more costly to the tax-
payer than a fully funded grant program for the same number of students, and
much more costly to the taxpayer than an expanded federal loan program. If
the Clinton program makes sense - and it may - it must be on the basis of
the benefits of national service, not because it expands access to higher
education.
Id.; see also Jennifer Babson, Goodling Amendment to National Service Plan Fails on
Floor, July 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, SNS File. The bill as intro-
duced provided that the amount of the "national service award" would not be considered
income for tax purposes, although the "living allowance" would not be excluded from
gross income. See 139 CONG. REc. 55594 (1993) (proposed H.R. 2010, 103d Cong., Ist
Sess. § 148(0 (1993): loan repayment amount); 139 CONG. REC. S5594 (proposed H.R.
2010, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. § 140(a)(5) (1993): living allowance). Perhaps this was
designed to parallel the tax treatment of scholarships, which are tax-free only to the
extent they cover tuition and related expenses, but not living costs. I.R.C. § 117. See
generally Crane, supra note 139. In any event, these proposals did not survive in confer-
ence. See National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-82,
§§ 101(b), 102(a), 107 Stat. 785, 788 (1993) (creating 42 U.S.C.A. § 12501 (West
Supp. 1994), and adding § 148 to subtitle D of title I of the National and Community
Service Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.A. § 12571 (West Supp. 1994))).
189. 139 CONG. REC. S5627 (daily ed. May 6, 1993).
190. Id. For those saddled with tens of thousands of dollars in debts, one lesser-
publicized feature of Clinton's student loan proposal would offer extended periods of time
in which to repay even a fixed (i.e, non-income contingent) loan. Cf. McPherson & Skin-
ner, supra note 56, at 29 ("[T]he standard loans available to college students must be
paid back within 10 years after they leave school - even though the returns on the
investment in education are spread over the rest of their lives.").
191. 139 CONG. REc. S5627 (daily ed. May 6, 1993).
192. Id. at S5630.
D. Who Should Pay for the Insurance Features of an Income-
Contingent Loan?
Income-contingent student loans are not new.193 Milton Friedman
first proposed them over thirty years ago, 9 4 and various proposals
have surfaced over the years. Another economics Nobel Prize win-
ner, James Tobin, helped Yale University design a tuition postpone-
ment plan with an income-contingent repayment feature, which ran
in the 1970s.1' 5 With varying levels of subsidies, several other coun-
tries employ income-contingent insurance features to protect their
graduates from the risks of a poor job market. 96 Indeed, Clinton's
193. For a thorough description of early income contingent plans, see JOHNSTONE,
supra note 45. Surprisingly, Professor Johnstone, who is now chancellor of the State
University of New York and current chairman of the College Board, recently termed
income-contingent loans "old, overrated gimmicks." Johnstone, supra note 188, at 46.
194. FRIEDMAN, supra note 125, at 104-07. Friedman's proposal, as well as the
later, even more theoretical, proposal offered by economist William Vickrey, sought to
isolate the "value added" by a college education. If, for example, an unambitious kid
with few prospects achieves a high-paying job after college, a large amount of his future
salary should be claimed to repay the amount loaned. By contrast, a bright and accom-
plished kid who merely fulfills her adolescent promise after college would owe little.
JOHNSTONE, supra note 45, at 69-70 (discussing William S. Vickrey, A Proposal for
Student Loans, in ECONOMICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 268-80 (Selma Mushkin ed.,
1962)). Such a proposal has obvious equity limitations in addition to valuation limita-
tions. The only way to treat these two students equivalently would be to tax the second
one on the increased "endowment" she inherited or developed prior to entering college.
Cf Warren, supra note 111, at 1113-14 ("[T]he individual who has an innate ability to
play basketball or to pick successful television shows has at some point in his life ac-
quired significant human capital, which is an increment in wealth that should in theory
be subject to taxation under the Haig-Simons concept.").
195. See also discussion infra part II.E.2.
196. Australia only recently imposed any tuition charges on those attending col-
leges, making income-contingent loans available to cushion the burden. See Memoran-
dum from Bob Shireman, Legislative Assistant, to Senator Paul Simon (Mar. 6, 1993)
(on file with author). Nor do English schools currently charge tuition, and their govern-
ment even provides housing allowances, but the amount of these grants was frozen in
1990 and replaced with student loans charging interest set at the rate of inflation. Neasa
MacErlean, Spotting the Difference in the Big Banks' Student Packages, INDEPENDENT,
July 17, 1993, at 21 (interest rate is scheduled to fall to 1.2% from 3.9% in 1992-93 and
5.8% the previous year); Jill Papworth, The Black Cloud that Hangs Over Students in
the Red, GUARDIAN, July 3, 1993, at 29 (government-provided housing allowances for
students were frozen in 1990, replaced with low-cost student loans). In its report Learn-
ing to Succeed, Britain's National Commission on Education recommended in Novem-
ber, 1993, that the U.K. should require students to shoulder more of the cost of their
higher education through income-contingent student loans, repayable through the tax
system; ironically, Britain is subject to the same budgetary accounting rules that used to
apply to Congress (see BOSWORTH. ET AL., supra note 164), and so the Commission rec-
ommended that the loans be funded by private parties with a government guarantee (cit-
ing the U.S. model!). See Liz Heron, Education: The High Cost of Learning,
INDEPENDENT, Dec. 9, 1993, at 30; Christopher Johnson, Personal Viewpoint: Lesson In
Maximizing Human Capital, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1994, at 21. A study recently recom-
mended that Canadian students should repay loans in proportion to post-graduate in-
come, with Revenue Canada serving as collector. EDWIN G. WEST. ENDING THE
SQUEEZE ON UNIVERSITIES (1993) (basing the proposal on New Zealand's 1992 model,
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proposal contained many of the features of bills introduced the previ-
ous year by Senators Simon, Bradley, Durenberger, and Kennedy,
and by Congressmen Petri and Miller.
197
A lender can adopt any one of a myriad of income-contingent loan
models.' 9 8 The models raise issues of design, implementation, and
acceptance not found in conventional loans. This section focuses on
the "insurance" features of these loans. There are two basic types of
income-contingent loans: those that are "mutualized" and those that
enjoy an external subsidy."99
A mutualized plan breaks even, so that in the aggregate each pool
of borrowers returns the principal borrowed plus interest (and costs).
Each borrower, however, pays only a stated percentage of his or her
income, with the winners in the education pay-off subsidizing the
losers.200 In a sense, while the lender still acts as a creditor, the bor-
rowers in the group act almost as partners, taking an equity stake in
each others' economic future until the cohort repays the obligation.
There is usually a cap, however, on how much any successful gradu-
ate is required to pay, either as a multiple of principal borrowed or
as effective interest rate paid;20 1 and every borrower is commonly
required to pay at least the amount of principal borrowed, to avoid
which he views as superior to Australia's 1989 oversubsidized plan). See generally John-
stone, supra note 11, at 89 (studying England, France, West Germany, Sweden, and
Romania). Recently, Germany's Education Minister was forced to resign after students
rioted in protest of the government's decision to freeze interest-free loans to those from
low-income families. See German Education Minister Resigns, Feb. 3, 1994, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, XINHUA File, Item No. 0203062.
197. See The Income-Dependent Education Assistance Act: Hearing on H.R. 2336
Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2336]; The Self-
Reliance Scholarship Act: Hearings on H.R. 3050 Before the Subcomm. on Postsecon-
dary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992); Federal Direct Student Loans: Hearing on S. 2255 Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Hearing on S.
2255]. In the July 1992 amendments to the Higher Education Act, Congress approved a
small pilot program of direct lending, with an income-contingent repayment feature, to
begin in 1994 (see President Signs Bill Reauthorizing the Higher Education Amend-
ments Act of 1965, BNA BANKING REP., July 27, 1992, at 127, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, BNABNK File); obviously it is superseded by the new legislation, also
scheduled to begin in 1994 (see infra note 223, discussing final regulations for the pilot
program).
198. See JOHNSTONE, supra note 45, for an excellent analysis of the policy alterna-
tives and financial constraints.
199. Id. at 109-14.
200. See id. at 154-56 ("If incomes should fail to rise as expected, however, repay-
ments would fail to cover cost even with no defaults.").
201. See Marc Nerlove, Some Problems in the Use of Income-Contingent Loans
for the Finance of Higher Education, 83 J. POL. ECON. 157 (1975).
the issue of income from the discharge of indebtedness. By contrast,
in an externally subsidized program, each borrower still pays a per-
centage of income but only until that borrower has repaid what he or
she borrowed with interest; any shortfall in repayments made by the
lower-earning members of the pool is made up by an external source
(usually the educational institution or the government). If desired, a
plan could, by its choice of interest rate and "exit" formula, combine
some mutualized and some subsidized features.
Income-contingent loans require repayment only as measured by
"adjusted gross income" as defined by the tax rules - and adjusted
gross income, at best, includes only money and money's worth.20 2
Those whose rewards come in the form of psychic income will, if the
loan terminates before all interest has been paid, fare better than
those paid in monetary terms. Whether this is a weakness or a
strength evidently depends on what you think is more "valuable" to
society. One scholar wonders, "More important than a possible but
improbable labor market effect may be the equity of such discrimi-
nation: why should some be forgiven portions of their debts simply
because they freely chose to be ministers rather than corporate law-
yers? ' 20 3 Far from troubling President Clinton, this possibility
served as the foundation of his proposal: "A student torn between
pursuing a career in teaching or corporate law, for example, will be
able to make a career choice based on what he or she wants to do,
not how much he or she can earn to pay off college debt."2 °0 (An-
other possible explanation for low income is that the graduate
dropped out of the labor market to have children; most income-con-
tingent loan plans, including Clinton's, base the repayment obliga-
tion on the joint income of a married couple. 205 )
202. By contrast, in determining "need" for eligibility for grants or subsidized stu-
dent loans, the federal government considers various nontaxed resources of the borrower
or the family, including child support, welfare, tax-exempt bond interest, untaxed pension
and social security benefits, and tax-deductible contributions to individual retirement ac-
counts. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1087vv(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1994).
203. JOHNSTONE, supra note 45, at 104; see also MCPHERSON & SCHAPIRO, supra
note 42, at 182 n.39 ("It is worth noting that policies which subsidize the preparation of
people to enter 'underserved' occupations tend to suppress wages in those professions by
adding to the supply.").
204. President William J. Clinton, Radio Address to the Nation (May 1, 1993),
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, REUTRN File.
205. See JOHNSTONE, supra note 45, at 93-97 (discussing the problem of the fe-
male graduate's "negative dowry," while properly noting that the "charge, however, is
peculiar neither to income contingency nor to women"); Student Loan Reform Act of
1993, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1087e(e) (West Supp. 1994). For married taxpayers, this new law
requires repayment as a percentage of joint adjusted gross income; what happens if both
spouses are repaying income contingent debt? The Yale plan based repayment on the
borrower's own income, or one-half of joint income if higher. While the new law applies
to the borrower's income alone, the study called for in the statute urges that considera-
tion be given for "adequate treatment of marriage," including "no excessive marriage
penalties or subsidies, no ability to avoid payment by shifting income between spouses,
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Yale University operated a mutualized program in the 1970s,
styled a "Tuition Postponement Option" (or "TPO").206 The univer-
sity created the program "when finances caused the administration
to raise the term bill without offering an accompanying increase in
conventional financial aid levels. . . . Later payments would be less
burdensome than with conventional loans because repayment would
be over a longer period and payment amounts would be contingent
on income level. '207 Simply put, this means that Yale formalized
equal payments for couples with equal joint income and borrowing, and fair allocation of
a later payment between two spouses' accounts (in case of later divorce)." OBRA Con-
ference Report, supra note 32, at 467-68. It is mathematically impossible to simultane-
ously satisfy the first and third of these conditions. See Bittker, supra note 69, at 1396
("we cannot simultaneously have (a) progression, (b) equal taxes on equal-incomed
couples, and (c) a marriage-neutral tax burden").
206. A total of 3602 students participated, and 718 (19.9%) repaid their obliga-
tions in full by June 7, 1993. Letter from Arthur A. Gallagher, Yale University Associ-
ate Bursar, to Evelyn Brody (June 7, 1993) (on file with author).
Yale obtained a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service blessing the favorable tax
consequences of every aspect of the plan. Rev, Rul. 72-2, 1972-1 C.B. 19; see Yale Univ.
Office of Student Loan Accounting and Collections, Questions and Answers, Question 9
(1988) (prepared for distribution to Tuition Postponement Plan participants) (on file
with author). Not only were interest payments tax-deductible under the law then in ef-
fect, but also Rev. Rul. 72-2, at 20, allowed the allocation of payments first entirely to
principal. This ensured that by the time the graduate got around to paying interest, he or
she was in a really high tax bracket and could best benefit from the interest deduction.
Indeed, Yale determined that the 1986 Tax Reform Act's repeal of the consumer interest
deduction "led 280 to 300 borrowers to buy out of TPO." Yale Univ. Office of Financial
Aid, Tuition Postponement Option (1988) (on file with author) [hereinafter Tuition Post-
ponement Option]. Yale's ruling for frontloading principal repayments wound up double-
harming its TPO participants: They lost the deductions before 1986 to the extent they
were characterizing interest as principal and they lost the postponed amounts after repeal
of the interest deduction.
Not clear about the Yale plan (as a mutuaiized plan) is whether the "winners" can
now claim that "excess" payments are not interest at all but rather qualify as charitable
contributions to a type of "deferred scholarship fund" for the benefit of* the low earners
in the pool. Cf JOHNSTONE, supra note 45, at 175. Such an argument has no merit. The
excess payments really represent "losing" the lottery by succeeding in the job market,
and just like any other insurance premium must be characterized ex ante. Cf Gail Jor-
dan Hupper, Note, Moral Obligation Financial Aid Programs: A Section 170 Analysis,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1402, 1402 (1984) (discussing students who receive financial aid
awards "on the condition that he or she undertake a nonbinding obligation to transfer a
ike amount to the school at some later date").
207. Rena Cheskis, Yale Univ. Office of Institutional Research, Rep. No. R00184,
The Yale Tuition Postponement Option Loan Experience 1 (1984) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Yale TPO Experience]. In 1976, Yale terminated the TPO program, which
was available to all students regardless of financial resources, but Yale also operated a
companion program for financially needy students only, the "Contingent Repayment Op-
tion" (CRO), from 1974, until 1980. Id. at 1, 6. (For simplicity, I refer simply to TPO,
although the needs-based requirement of CRO raises all the issues already discussed.)
Yale terminated TPO ostensibly because the Middle Income Student Assistance Act of
shifting more of the higher education costs to the students them-
selves, recognizing that the students will be able to repay out of fu-
ture income.208
Under the Yale plan, upon finishing schooling a borrower joined a
pool of all others finishing at the same time. Each group had the
obligation to repay the amount borrowed, plus Yale's cost of borrow-
ing and an administrative fee. Twice a year each member made pay-
ments equal to a modest percentage of income. A member could exit
the group early, upon repaying 150 percent of the amount borrowed.
The group as a whole would terminate no later than thirty-five years
after formation (this date represented the borrowed amount divided
by the minimum required payment, so that, barring default, no bor-
rower escaped liability for at least the principal). According to a
1984 study conducted by the university, the complexities of TPO
baffled the borrowers.
20 9
In an externally subsidized program, the sponsor bears the costs of
underpayment; once you define the interest rate,21 0 there is no risk to
any particular borrower of doing better than average. By contrast,
the promoter of a mutualized program worries about adverse selec-
tion - the disinclination of those who expect to be high earners to
participate. A market-run insurance scheme avoids adverse selection
by "risk rating" according to "statistically predictable earnings po-
tential." 211 However, this technique, observes Professor Johnstone,
would be "both politically impossible and ethically indefensible" for
a university or governmental lender.212
Consequently, forced cross-subsidization works only to the extent
you can compel participation from the subsidizers. The Yale TPO
imposed income-contingent repayment as a condition to making the
loan.2' 3 Thus, those students who expected to be wealthier could still
1978 extended subsidized guaranteed student loan eligibility to all income classes. Tui-
tion Postponement Option, supra note 206. However, after Congress removed the subsidy
for higher-income borrowers in 1981, supra note 179, Yale did not reinstate the program.
208. The time-honored ad hoc method for successful students to pay more for their
schooling is through later (generally tax-deductible) charitable contributions. See, e.g.,
Stephan, supra note 62, at 1373 (calling these donations "deferred" tuition).
209. See Yale TPO Experience, supra note 207, at 4 ("Less than half of all survey
participants indicated that they understood how an individual or a repayment group com-
pleted repayment. To these fifty percent, TPO/CRO must seem to be a never-ending
obligation.").
210. See discussion of whether the Clinton plan is mutualized or externally subsi-
dized, infra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
211. JOHNSTONE, supra note 45, at 112.
212. Id.
213. Yale TPO Experience, supra note 207, at 6. Accordingly, "approximately 34
percent of all Freshmen in 1971-1972 took TPO, 53 percent of aid students, and 13
percent of non-aid students." Id. This leads one to wonder whether greater access to
funding merely leads to tuition inflation (the "Bennett hypothesis," named after William
E. Bennett, Secretary of Education under President Reagan). McPHERSON & SCHAPIRO,
supra note 42, at 72, rebut the argument "that private institutions increase their tuitions
504
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opt out by paying for their college education with cash or borrowings
from other sources. Yet the high cost at some of the Yale schools
appeared to balance the low income prospects of graduates from
other schools: "a Divinity student may have been encouraged to take
an income-contingent loan because of his likelihood of earning a low
income, while TPO/CRO may have been the only loan option left
for Medical students.1
214
In the absence of forced participation, a mutualized income-con-
tingent loan proposal could succeed only if the pooled group were
homogeneous in carrying more or less the same expected income
stream.215 Individual bad luck is typically what we are willing to in-
sure against; moreover, if the general economy goes south, those who
were doing well are as likely as the others to suffer a diminution in
income (the base on which payments are measured).
Is the Clinton plan mutualized or externally subsidized? Those
who reach the end of the maximum repayment term (25 years) are
excused from any remaining unpaid principal or interest.21 In effect,
this functions as a scholarship in reverse. That is, the government
might want to make outright grants to low-income students, but, be-
yond a narrow range of those clearly in need, it cannot predict ex
ante who will be low-income measured over the long term. Accord-
ingly, the government waits a substantial period of time until the
graduate has reached the middle (and likely peak) of the life cycle of
earnings before making the determination. 7  The plan contains no
cross-subsidization feature, insists the Secretary of Education:
"When high-income borrowers fully repay their loans, they stop
9$218paying.
But is it true that income-contingent repayers with high incomes
when they receive more federal student aid," although underpriced state institutions
"tend to raise tuition by $50 for every $100 increase in federal student aid." Id.
214. Yale TPO Experience, supra note 207, at 7.
215. Cf. JOHNSTONE, supra note 45, at 112-13. "If students cannot be risk-rated
by the lender, they will almost certainly, if allowed, risk-rate themselves." Id. at 112.
216. OBRA Conference Report, supra note 32, at 447.
217. In order to maintain parity with up-front grants, Congress would need to pro-
vide that any amounts forgiven will be excluded from income to the extent he or she
would have qualified for section 117 relief (scholarships). Because the record keeping
burden might be horrendous and it is likely that the borrower will have repaid a good
portion of the borrowed principal by the time the loan is forgiven, Congress might as well
assume that any uncollected principal does not exceed the eligible section 117 amount.
218. Richard W. Riley, The Student-Loan Plan Deserves Better Marks, Bus. WK.,
July 12, 1993, at 7, 7 (letter to the editor).
do not cover any of the costs of borrowers with lower incomes? Con-
gress seems to want it both ways. In the statutory language, the in-
terest rate formulas for each borrower are determined at the outset,
when the borrower qualifies under one of the subsidized or unsub-
sidized programs. Thus, the rate does not depend on the eventual
repayment method selected. However, the description of repayment
plans under the bill stated: "[T]o the extent possible, the cost to the
Federal Government for each cohort of borrowers does not exceed
what such cost would be if all borrowers in the cohort selected the
standard repayment plan. '219 Because of the certain adverse selec-
tion that will occur should the cohort of income-contingent repayers
be mutualized, the government cannot effectively maintain the same
interest rate for that pool as for those repaying under the standard
(or extended) fixed-interest methods.
To conclude that the Clinton program is externally subsidized is
actually to say that taxpayers pick up the tab for the insurance fea-
ture. Indeed, a taxpaying low-income non-borrower (perhaps some-
one who even did not go to college) subsidizes a low-income
borrower earning the same (or higher) income. Why shouldn't we
deal with the adverse selection problem by imposing market interest
rates on all student loan borrowers? After all, the fact that the bor-
rower rejects the income-contingent repayment option plan would
usually imply that she has already decided that she won (lost?) the
income lottery. Nevertheless, the government fronted her finances at
the outset. Observe that more adverse selection can occur the more
time we allow the borrower to make the choice between a conven-
tional loan and an income-contingent one: an entering freshman
might harbor hopes of being a nurse, but by the time she starts re-
paying her loan, she might have studied to be a brain surgeon.
This is not to say that the government should convert all of its
financial aid resources from grants to market-rate loans. A genuinely
low income graduate could suffer "debt overhang" for many years,
limiting her access to credit for other worthy purposes. I strongly
advocate using our collective resources for grants to give a boost to
the disadvantaged - I just do not want the subsidy to go in the
other direction. As described in this article, though, if we cannot de-
velop better procedures to determine who is genuinely low-income we
should at least limit subsidized interest rates to the small class of
borrowers who would be unduly burdened repaying market interest
219. 139 CONG. REC. S5622-23 (1993).
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rates out of future income over the very long periods allowed in Clin-
ton's program.22 We can then preserve a fairer redistributive func-
tion for government by better targeting outright grants, subsidized
loans, or higher loans caps.22'
E. Administration of a Governmental Income-Contingent Loan
Program
1. Direct Lending
Separate from the repayment methods described above, President
Clinton obtained a radical restructuring in the way these loans are
issued and administered: from the current federal guarantee of third-
party loans222 to direct lending by the federal government. 223 Third-
220. Indeed, the Conference Report urges consideration of whether "the combina-
tion of IRS collection and an income-dependent repayment option provides an opportu-
nity further to streamline student loan programs and to target subsidies more fairly
based on the ability to repay loans, which can be determined by post-school income."
OBRA Conference Report, supra note 32, at 468.
221. Indeed, perhaps our current subsidies do not go far enough. For example,
federally guaranteed students loans typically may not be made in an amount greater than
the student's out-of-pocket costs of attending school (including living expenses). In those
rare cases where the parents depend on the child's earnings had she not gone to college,
the family should be permitted to borrow additional amounts.
222. In moving to a direct loan program, the Clinton Administration took on the
powerful banking industry and the secondary market makers, notably Sallie Mae. To
provide a liquid market for student loans, the federal government established the Student
Loan Marketing Association, a privately owned corporation, in 1972. With money it
raises by selling debt, Sallie Mae buys student loans that were issued by private lenders.
Sallie Mae "maintains a maturity structure of its debt that closely duplicates the short-
term interest rate structures of its assets. . . . Because of the guarantee and the match-
ing of the maturity structures of its assets and its liabilities, the activities of Sallie Mae
are practically devoid of any credit risk or interest rate risk." BOSWORTH ET AL., supra
note 164, at 143-44. Don't cry for Sallie Mae. In the Senate it succeeded in halving
Clinton's proposal for 100 % federal loan origination by 1998. See also, e.g., Dean Foust,
Sallie Mae: Still a Big Woman on Campus?, Bus. WK., Nov. 15, 1993, at 160; Maggie
Mahar, How Sallie Mae Will Survive, BARRON'S, June 14, 1993, at 10. Sallie Mae also
fought to preserve its role by announcing that it would reduce the interest rate by two
percentage points for graduates making timely payments for the first 48 months - for
loans issued after the start of 1993 that are subsequently sold to Sallie Mae, or for loans
already in the hands of Sallie Mae that the borrower begins to repay after July 1, 1993.
See Glenn Burkins, Timely Payments Can Earn Reward; Incentive for Student Loans
Tests Idea, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 21, 1993, at H2; College Loan Rate Cut for Prompt
Payers, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 1, 1992, § 1, at 11.
223. Congress provided for phased-in direct lending, beginning with 5 % of loans
made in 1994-95, 40% in 1995-96, 50% in 1996-97 and in 1997-98, and 60% beginning
in the 1998 academic year. OBRA 1993, supra note 8, at 342-43. An experimental di-
rect-lending pilot program was already scheduled to begin in 1994. Higher Education
Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 451(a), 106 Stat. 448, 569 (1992) (Fed-
eral Direct Loan Demonstration Program); 58 Fed. Reg. 36,088 (1993) (to be codified at
party lending has served two distinct functions: It left to the private
sector a large portion of the origination, servicing, and collections
functions, and, under federal budget rules in effect until recent re-
forms, the program appeared to cost the government less than direct
outlays of loan proceeds. While the second consideration no longer
holds, it is still fair to ask whether the atrophied Department of Edu-
cation can handle the extensive monitoring that would be required
by direct lending, with its extended and complex proposed repay-
ment schedules.224 If it wished to retain the guarantee role rather
than convert the federal role to direct lending, Congress could likely
save origination and in-payment costs by reducing the subsidies paid
to the lenders, and forcing the banks to share some of the cost of
reducing defaults.225 Further, the more flexible proposed repayment
options give the government the opportunity to impose market-rate
34 C.F.R. pt. 685) (effective date pending) (preamble to final regulations) ("These regu-
lations are being published under unusual circumstances" given that "passage of the Stu-
dent Loan Reform Act in some form seems likely."). On November 15, 1993, the
Department of Education named 105 colleges and universities that will issue 5 % of new
student loans in 1994-95; 1,100 institutions applied, of which 900 met the eligibility re-
quirements. See At 105 Colleges, A Cheaper Student Loan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993,
at A24.
224. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuB. No. GAO/AIMD-93-04, FI-
NANCIAL AUDIT: FEDERAL FAMILY EDUCATION LOAN PROGRAM'S FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1992 (1993). Because of the Education Department's error-
riddled database, inadequate financial reporting processes and procedures, and weak in-
ternal controls, the Department underestimates the costs of the current program by al-
most $1.5 billion a year, calling into question whether the savings anticipated by the
direct lending proposal could be fully realized. Id.; see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE. PUB. No. GAO/AIMD-93-33, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: EDUCATION'S STUDENT
LOAN PROGRAM CONTROLS OVER LENDERS NEED IMPROVEMENT (1993). Additionally:
Sallie Mae's lobbying strategy is to paint herself as the model of private sector
efficiency - phones are answered in ten seconds, bills and dunning notices fly
out the door, computers are state-of-the-art - except for those old, obsolete
tape drives which Sallie Mae needs to communicate with the Department of
Education.
Sallie Mae Is Fighting for Its Life (CNN television broadcast, May 24, 1993), available
in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CNN File, Transcript # 317-2; cf. Eglin, supra note 171, at
56. Loan information submitted electronically by the guarantee agencies to the Educa-
tion Department "is then stored in a database nicknamed the 'tape dump.' This mass of
unverified, sometimes incomplete, data is the only national database on the Stafford pro-
gram," resulting in the government's losing tens of millions of dollars on new loans made
to students already in default an old loans.). Critics of Clinton's plan also pointed to the
Federally Insured Student Loan Program (FISL), replaced by the current system, as a
failed experiment in direct lending. See, e.g., Perry D. Quick, Shaky Plan for Student
Loans, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 29, 1993, at 18 ("Neither the GAO nor the
administration has given us reason to believe that a new direct government loan system
would not fizzle like its predecessor.").
225. While the federal government reimburses guarantee agencies at less than
100% if their default percentages get too high, the current system perversely also pays a
30% bounty for collecting defaulted loans - thus inducing the guarantee agencies to let
the loan slide into default before undertaking enforcement efforts. See Mary Jordan,
Student Loan System Faulted; Debt Collectors' Conflicts Threaten Program, Hill Told,
WASH. POST, June 19, 1993, at A2 (at a cost of $26 million, the federal government in
1990 bailed out one guarantee agency, the Higher Education Assistance Foundation
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interest requirements on a greater range of borrowers, thus saving
more money.
Retaining third-party lending but permitting income-contingent
repayments, however, would prove difficult. A pilot project permit-
ting income-contingent repayment under the current third-party
lending system appeared in a vetoed tax bill from March, 1992,226
but Sallie Mae's president "could offer only a vague description of
how such a plan might work." '227 A third-party lender would demand
an intolerably high level of interest from all borrowers (or from the
federal government) to cover the risk of income shortfall from a par-
ticular borrower, not just because the loan is long-lived, but because
it bears an uncertain income stream.228 In other words, with govern-
ment issuance, the government can subsidize (or not) borrowers as
and when they make income-contingent payments, rather than antic-
ipate and fund an estimated shortfall with a likely expensive interest
factor.
2. Complexity and Burden of Income-Contingent
Repayment
The Clinton administration expects about fifteen percent of direct
student loan borrowers to choose the income-contingent repayment
("HEAF"), which "had many conflicts of interest with spinoff companies that were help-
ing it collect student debts"); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/
HRD-93-12BR, GUARANTY AGENCY SOLVENCY: CAN THE GOVERNMENT RECOVER
HEAF's FIRST-YEAR LIQUIDATION COST OF $212 MILLION? 3 (1992) ("For example,
assume that the Department [of Education] reimbursed an agency for a $100 defaulted
loan at the 80-percent rate and the agency subsequently collected $100 from the bor-
rower. First the agency retains the $20 for which it was not reimbursed. Then the agency
retains $30 ... to offset collection costs ... ."); cf. Becker, supra note 188, at 18 ("The
solution is not to eliminate banks and their experience but to require them to bear a
larger share of the cost of their bad student loans. Banks covet the student loan business.
When the default rate on a bank's student loans increases, it should have to pay a higher
insurance premium."). OBRA 1993, supra note 8, slightly shifts some of the default
burden to the guaranty agencies. See OBRA Conference Report, supra note 32, at 464-
65 (100%/90%/80% reimbursement rates reduced to 98%/88%/78%).
226. H.R. 4210, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1003 (1992).
227. Matthew Morrissey, Banking on Students, NAT'L. J., Feb. 6, 1993, at 339,
342 ("And in interviews, Consumer Bankers Association president Joseph Belew and
[Philip] Corwin of the American Bankers Association were not enthusiastic about the
idea."). The New England Education Loan Marketing Corporation ("Nellie Mae"), an-
other guarantee agency, issued a paper urging instead: "Private industry can also collect
repayment of loans over an extended period with appropriate consideration given to a
student's income level through graduated or stepped repayment plans which will readily
accommodate 95% of all borrowers and allow for individualized treatment of borrowers
needing more flexible terms." O'Toole, supra note 171, at 3.
228. JOHNSTONE, supra note 45, at 155-56, 160.
option.229
An income-contingent loan imposes heavy administrative burdens
on borrower and creditor alike. Compliance difficulties are only in-
creased by the youth and inexperience of the debtor. "[Flew stu-
dents understand the effect of compound interest over time,"
observed Professor Johnstone; "they are often shocked at the large
total dollar amounts involved in long-term loans, and express a pref-
erence for shorter repayment schedules and larger annual payments,
even though their general willingness to borrow reveals a strong pref-
erence for present as opposed to future income. "230
As mentioned above, Yale found high levels of misunderstanding
among TPO borrowers. Ironically, in a 1984 survey, those in "de-
fault" (defined as having missed a payment) "indicate that one rea-
son for entering into default has been their desire no longer to
receive nor to give support to others in their repayment group.
'231
This general suspicion of a loan with unconventional terms required
Yale to engage in heavy counseling of borrowers, over the very long
repayment period of the loan. 2
An easy way to avoid complexity is to adopt a graduated, but
fixed, series of annual payment limits; the borrower pays the stated
amount unless it exceeds his income-contingent ,percentage. Such a
schedule could, for example, require an annual payment of, say,
$250 in the first three years, $350 in the next three years, and $500
each year thereafter, unless four percent of adjusted gross income
were lower in any year. Thus, for "the majority of payments . . .
incomes would have to be neither reported by the borrower nor
monitored by the lender. '233 This would sweep away the underbrush
229. Full Implementation of Direct Student Loans May Be Delayed, Sen. Ken-
nedy Says, BNA's BANKING REP., May 31, 1993, at 791, available in LEXIS, NEWS
Library, BNABNK File (quoting Deputy Education Secretary Kunin).
230. JOHNSTONE, supra note 45, at 46. Even in prepared testimony, students reveal
their lack of understanding of how interest works. See Hearing on S. 2255, supra note
197, at 94 (Statement of the United States Student Association) ("She will have to pay
$8,362 for a $4,000 loan. It's crazy that poor people are expected to pay twice as much
for their education!"). Indeed, a poor borrower might have an even higher discount rate
than a wealthy borrower.
231. Yale TPO Experience, supra note 207, at 5.
232. Tuition Postponement Option, supra note 206, at 1; see also Yale TPO Expe-
rience, supra note 207, at 4; cf. Hearing on S. 2255, supra note 197, at 95 (Statement of
the United States Student Association) ("Where are students supposed to turn to for
counseling and information on their student loan repayment options and problems? The
IRS? * . . Will the IRS or the Department of Education provide counseling?"); Hearing
on H.R. 2336, supra note 197, at 80 (statement of Michael S. Bigelow, Deputy Assistant
Commissioner, Returns Processing, Internal Revenue Service) ("[T]here would be a tre-
mendous impact on Taxpayer Service sites and service centers which would have to re-
spond to inquiries on these notices each year during our busiest season.").
233. JOHNSTONE, supra note 45, at 124. Professor Johnstone adds: "Unless some
arrangement were made to have income contingent loans collected along with taxes by
the Internal Revenue Service, fixed schedule payments should be cheaper to collect and
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of small loan balances, while offering the income insurance desired
by the borrower.234 Additionally, we might expect some borrowers to
choose income-contingent repayment for only their first few years in
the workforce, and then revert to a shorter-term, fixed-dollar method
after their incomes rise.23 5
Finally, because we would be throwing the most complex loan
terms at those who by definition have the lowest income prospects,
we should consider wiser use of outright grants for those likely to
realize low incomes for a significant period of time. 36
3. IRS's Role in Administration
In introducing his direct lending proposal, President Clinton
thundered:
[M]y proposal is to have a direct line from the government that you have to
pay back after you go to work at tax time. So, you can't beat the bill. You
can't - if you're earning income and you're in the tax system, you must
pay it back. You can't beat it. We'll have a ... loan default rate that will
be about the same rate as the tax evasion rate which is a lot lower than the
student loan evasion rate, right?
3 7
Clinton sought to use the Internal Revenue Service to collect loans in
income-contingent repayment status; some members of Congress
would like to use the Service to collect all direct student loans. As we
will see below, switching to direct lending need not alone require
less subject to underpayment or default." Id. As I discuss below, this mechanism would
equally benefit the IRS as collector.
234. See Yale TPO Experience, supra note 207, at 5 ("TPO/CRO is a long term
loan, and has been metaphorically compared to taking out a mortgage on one's educa-
tion. Yet, unlike a mortgage . . .a main attraction of TPO/CRO was the relatively
small financial burden .... [A] majority of both defaulters and non-defaulters would
prefer, instead, a shorter repayment scheme with more moderate payments.").
235. Cf. id. at 10 ("[W]hile we hope that students will remain appreciative of
their Alma Mater over time, borrowers say that they resent being financially tied to an
educational institution for a twenty-to-thirty year period.").
236. See, e.g., Ann Coles, The Dilemmas of Loan Counseling A Practitioner
Viewpoint, in STUDENT LOANS: RISKS AND REALITIES, supra note 11, at 56, 56 ("Women
comprise two-thirds of the borrowers who have to commit more than 10 percent of their
income to student loans. [Of borrowers devoting this high a percentage to loans], 80
percent were single, and many of those single borrowers had dependent children.").
237. Address by President-Elect Bill Clinton at Wilbur Wright Community Col-
lege, Chicago, Illinois, supra note 26; cf. James D. Gordon III, Interplanetary Intelli-
gence About Promissory Notes as Securities, 69 TEx. L. REV. 383, 401 n.145 (1990)
("[T]he government can protect itself by withholding wages to recover student loan pay-
ments. For example, if you graduate with a Ph.D. in Renaissance Literature, every week
the government could withhold some of the tips you earn as a waiter."). The percentage
of students defaulting fell to 17.5% of borrowers in 1991. U.S. Student Loan Default
Rate Drops in FY 1991, supra note 171. The "tax gap" is harder to pin down.
Internal Revenue Service involvement. However, offering an income-
contingent repayment mechanism makes at least some IRS partici-
pation inevitable.238
As a threshold matter, we should recognized that, even in the case
of income-contingent repayment, this does not necessarily require
that the Internal Revenue Service actually collect student loans. 239
As long as Congress gives the Service the ability to share tax return
information, private bill collectors could be informed of the borrow-
ers' adjusted gross income. As discussed below, private bill collectors
might be even more nimble than the Service in collecting these obli-
gations. Finally, it is hard to imagine that wage withholding offers
superior convenience to borrowers than, say, automatic payment
from checking accounts, and wage withholding is certainly more bur-
densome to employers.
When originally introduced in the Senate education committee,
Clinton's proposal contemplated an Internal Revenue Service collec-
tion function. To avoid turf battles with the Capitol Hill tax-writing
committees, however, the conferees finally just requested the Secre-
taries of Education and Treasury to study the feasibility of IRS col-
lection.2 40 Congress gave the Department of Education access only
"in establishing the income-contingent repayment amount" (and this
disclosure authority expires in five years).241 The conference bill
dropped a new section 6306 of the Code, passed by the Senate,
which would have permitted the President to implement repayment
of federal direct student loans through wage withholding or other
means. This proposal would have provided that these amounts would
be treated as "additional income taxes due," and would have re-
quired the Secretary of the Treasury to establish any necessary pro-
cedures and conventions, including:
242
238. For the demonstration program of direct lending, "the Secretary does not an-
ticipate that the IRS will be involved in the actual loan collection process through payroll
deductions." 58 Fed. Reg. 36,088, 36,092 (1993) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 685)
(effective date pending) (preamble to final regulations).
239. Hearing on H.R. 2336, supra note 197, at 75 (statement of Michael S. Bige-
low, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Returns Processing, Internal Revenue Service)
("Congress and the Administration must ultimately make the policy decision whether
IRS should become the collection agent for all federal debts.").
240. OBRA Conference Report, supra note 32, at 466. This study, still not pub-
lished as of September 1994, was due six months after the August 1993 enactment of the
bill, in time to implement its recommendations in 1994, when very limited direct student
lending will begin. Note that this contemplated use of the Internal Revenue Service ex-
tends beyond income contingent loans, the collection of which obviously requires access
to tax return information.
241. See id. at 279-81.
242. The following wording appears in House Bill 2264 section 12055(e), creating
nev Internal Revenue Code section 6306; slightly different wording appears in House
Bill 2264 section 12011, adding new section 457 to 20 U.S.C. section 1087a (the Higher
Education Act of 1965).
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(1) procedures for disputes to be resolved through the Secretary of
Education;
243
(2) an alternate system of fees and penalties (not to include IRS
seizure of real property), for the nonpayment of amounts due;244 and
(3) provisions related to withholding, payment of estimated tax, and
allocation of payments.245
Instead, the managers of the conference "reaffirm that IRS collec-
tion of student loans should be explored" 246 and that the principles
of an earlier proposal by Congressman Petri 47 "provide a useful
guide to that exploration.1 248 The conferees then set out numerous
principles, some of them inconsistent with earlier versions of the bill,
and some of them inconsistent with each other. Among these are
that "IRS collection should be as convenient as possible for borrow-
ers";2 49 "it should impose no additional burden on employers" ;250
and to minimize the burden on the IRS, "it should conform as
closely as possible to the operations of the IRS in collecting the regu-
lar individual income tax, self employment tax, and social security
taxes on tip income. 251 In pondering this assignment, the Treasury
and Education Departments will have to resolve many questions,
among them:
243. Presumably student loan borrowers cannot contest their liability in the Tax
Court. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 461, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1992) (conference report to
H.R. 4210) (passed Mar. 20, 1992; vetoed the same day) ("Self-Reliance Loans" propo-
sal required borrower to appeal errors to the Department of Education, whose "decisions
will be reviewable by the appropriate district court as a final agency determination").
244. If the loan repayment obligations constitute "taxes" a host of broad IRS rem-
edies would kick in. In addition, a tax liability on a joint return can be satisfied from
either spouse, whereas under state law (except community property states) a student loan
is generally a separate obligation of the borrower. The Service's powers of "shoot first,
ask questions later" evidently provided an unacceptably low level of due process for stu-
dent loan defaulters. The Senate obviously felt that the interest rate and penalties im-
posed on underpayments of tax would likely be higher than those desired by the
Department of Education for loan defaults.
245. However, the vetoed March 1992 Self-Reliance Loan proposal contemplated
that the Treasury "will determine the liability of borrowers for incorrect withholding
according to rules on estimated tax payments." H.R. REP. No. 461, supra note 243.
Treating contingent loan repayments as taxes would also increase the burden on employ-
ers, who must make deposits of withheld taxes on a regular basis, the frequency of which
depends on the amounts collected. Hearing on H.R. 2336, supra note 197, at 89-90
(statement of Michael S. Bigelow, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Returns Processing,
Internal Revenue Service).






i. How do we determine the required payment?
Unless the repayment schedule adopts the income ceiling proposal
discussed above, each borrower will be able to calculate his addi-
tional "tax" only with great difficulty. (It's hard enough just doing
your taxes once a year.25 2) This means either basing the percentage
on last year's income, or waiving penalties for underpayment of
tax.25 3 In either case, if a borrower does not adjust wage withholding
or make estimated tax payments, the liability can seem invisible, and
appear overwhelming when it shows up in a lump sum on April 15
each year.2 54 Self-employed taxpayers create additional problems
(often free from third-party reporting, they are already our least
252. The IRS would have to find a way to squeeze another line onto the Form
1040, which "is much easier said than done." Hearing on H.R. 2336, supra note 197, at
78 (statement of Michael S. Bigelow, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Returns Process-
ing, Internal Revenue Service) ("In addition to changing the form and instructions, we
would need to re-write software, design new processing routines in the service centers,
train staff . . . . account for money collected with the returns, and inform and advise
taxpayers . . ... "); see also Miscellaneous Tax Bills and the Peace Tax Fund: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the Comm. on Ways and Means
House of Representatives on H.R. 65 What Can I Do for America Act, H.R. 1733 to
Exempt from Income Tax Certain Common Investment Funds, and H.R. 1870 United
States Peace Tax Fund, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1992) (statement of Terrill A. Hyde,
Tax Legislative Counsel, Department of the Treasury), statement available in LEXIS,
FEDTAX Library, TNT File as 92 TNT 108-39 (opposing proposal to add voluntary
check-offs to the tax return). Hyde explained:
Space on the income tax form is already allocated to maximize compliance.
Mandating additional items displaces items crucial to the proper reporting and
collection of tax. It can be expected that tax receipts relating to the dropped
items will suffer. It is possible that voluntary contributions to federal programs
pursuant to this bill will not compensate for the lost tax revenue from reduced
compliance in these other areas.
Id.
253. Compare the March 1992 Self-Reliance Loan proposal: "Not later than Jan-
uary 31 of each calendar year, the Secretary of Education will certify to each borrower
the amount of interest and principal paid on such loans for the second preceding calendar
year." H.R. REP. No. 461, supra note 243, at 335.
254. Nellie Mae also emphasizes the unique burdens that loan repayment through
wage withholding would impose on employers (regardless of income-contingent repay-
ment). First, "each student's (employee's) education loan debt would be different, some
$5,000, some $7,500, some $25,000. Thus, verification and calculation requirements
would differ by employee as opposed to a set percentage of FICA taxes being applied to
each employee equally." O'Toole, supra note 171, at 4. Second, "recordkeeping [would]
be cumulative and transferable. An employer would have to keep track of amortizing
student loan debt for as long as 20 years or more and provisions [would] have to be
created to transfer to subsequent or multiple employers a student loan repayment his-
tory." Id. Proponents of IRS collection argue, however, that the employer need never
know why the employee is simply requesting an additional amount of taxes withheld (a
request that employers already must honor), and that the recordkeeping on the loan bal-
ance is simply a matter between the borrower and the IRS at tax time on the Form 1040.
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compliant sector 2'5). Married borrowers raise unique issues of fair-
ness, as they do generally under our progressive income tax.25 16
ii. How do we allocate tax payments throughout the year to the
loan?
Desiring "payments" to be due any more often than annually
raises not just "stacking order" issues of when payments of interest
and principal are considered made, but the more fundamental issue
of determining the amount of interest accruing on the remaining
principal. 57 Finally, from the Service's viewpoint, should there be an
understatement of "actual" tax liability for the year, the Service will
want amounts collected to be treated as actual taxes rather than as
loan repayments to be allocated to the Department of Education.
iii. Will the Service have to adopt special collection procedures?
Congress has already given the Internal Revenue Service the au-
thority to offset tax refunds against debts due the federal govern-
ment, including defaulted student loans.258 It is a peculiar statute -
all the debtor has to do is reduce withholding to create a balance-due
tax return - but it is easy to administer. The Service conducted
four studies showing that taxpayers at risk of losing refunds not only
reduced withholding but further, in some cases, simply stopped fil-
ing. 259 By contrast, Congress's auditing arm, the General Accounting
Office, found these effects to be short-lived, and "that the revenue
from increased debt collection will outweigh any decline in revenue
255. See, e.g., 1992 IRS ANN. REP. (Pub. 55, May 1, 1993) ("we believe the most
important challenges to our system of tax administration come from those who fail to
* . .report self-employment income accurately"); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. PUB.
No. GAO/HRD-92-108. TAX ADMINISTRATION: APPROACHES FOR IMPROVING INDEPEN-
DENT CONTRACTOR COMPLIANCE 1 (1992) ("As early as 1979, we concluded that non-
compliance among self-employed workers, such as independent contractors, was serious
enough to warrant some form of tax withholding on payments to them.").
256. See supra note 205.
257. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 461, supra note 243, at 334 ("Repayment tax payments
received on or before the due date ... for filing of the income tax return for a given
taxable year are credited to the taxpayer's Self-Reliance Loan account as if received on
the last day of the previous taxable year"; similarly, payments received later are treated
"as if received on the last day of the following taxable year.").
258. Enacted in 1984, the experiment will sunset in 1994 unless Congress is satis-
fied that program does not adversely affect tax compliance. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE. PUB. No. GAO/GGD-91-64. TAX POLICY: REFUND OFFSET PROGRAM BENEFITS
APPEAR TO EXCEED COSTS (1991). Congress also gave the IRS authority to offset re-
funds against child support obligations. Id.
259. Id.
from taxpayer noncompliance. 260
The General Accounting Office, however, recently criticized the
Internal Revenue Service for following "a lengthy and rigid three-
stage collection process that begins with a series of written notices,
or bills, sent to delinquent taxpayers over a period of about 6
months, followed by telephone calls, and ends with visits to delin-
quent taxpayers."'26' Further, Congress prohibited the agency from
sharing tax return information with private bill collectors, and from
evaluating or rewarding its staff on the basis of collection results. 262
By contrast, "many state tax departments and private sector collec-
tors" make effective use of early telephone contact, employ private
collectors, and use performance bonuses to motivate staff.263 The
GAO recommends legislative and administrative changes to allow
the Service to compete with other bill collectors and state govern-
ments for payments from debtors who likely have insufficient assets
to cover all their liabilities.264
Accordingly, contrary to popular perception, the Internal Revenue
Service is particularly unsuited to collecting these relatively small
amounts. In the first place, as described in part I.C, a taxpayer need
not even file if her gross income is less than her personal exemption
plus the standard deduction - will loan obligations count as part of
this tax liability threshold?2 65 Even for uncontested tax liabilities,
260. Id.
261. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/GGD-93-67. TAX ADMINIS-
TRATION: NEw DELINQUENT TAX COLLECTION METHODS FOR IRS 1 (1993).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Saddled with high expectations yet hamstrung by congressionally imposed re-
strictions, the IRS must secretly envy private bill collectors. Consider the following ac-
count given of a private child support collection:
"They not only harassed me . . . they tried to irritate me by constantly saying
things that are not true," [the father] said. "They called my job several times,
threatening my accountant at work.
"When I called them back to explain, they automatically said I was lying.
They said I was scum."
Drake [the collector] says he wants deadbeat parents to feel uncomfortable.
"It takes a lot of work to extract money out of these guys," he said. "These
guys in my opinion are criminals. They're stealing from their own kids."
Vivian Marino, Run For the Money, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 1993, § 6, at 1, 15.
265. Low-income borrowers who file anyway in order to claim the earned income
tax credit might use the refundable portion to pay down student debt. See, e.g, Guy
Gugliotta, How to Aid 'Working Poor? Tax Credit Serves as Lifeline but Has Its Crit-
iCS, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1993, at Al ("The IRS has used [one borrower's] EITC
($2,200 over the last two years) to pay down student loans that she has used in her quest
to become a child psychologist. She will probably achieve her goal, thanks, in part, to the
EITC."); cf., 138 CONG. REC. H1914-16 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1992) (proposed amend-
ment to the Higher Education Amendments Act of 1992, that would prevent offsetting
tax refunds by, or collecting, defaulted student loans "unless the net income of the stu-
dent borrower and the borrower's spouse, including any cash benefits received under a
needs-based government assistance program, exceeds 150% of the poverty level for the
size of the family which the student borrower has"); see also H.R. REP. No. 461, supra
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the Service uses a dollar threshold below which it forbears collec-
tion.26 6 For obvious reasons, the agency keeps this amount secret;
nevertheless it likely exceeds all but the largest student loan
balances.26 7
CONCLUSION
A college education is a unique human capital investment. It
"pays off" for most students, and continues to pay off over their life-
times. However, college can also be enormously expensive, which
blocks access for those whose parents do not have the current means
to finance it. Private lenders will not lend against future income. Un-
til very recently, the federal government remedied this market fail-
ure exclusively by guaranteeing repayment of student loans issued by
private lenders. Beginning in July 1994, in a legislative victory for
President Clinton, the federal government began to make "direct"
student loans, scheduled to reach sixty percent of new student loan
volume by 1998. Direct lending will also allow the government to
offer the student a novel repayment option: the graduate can elect to
repay the principal and interest out of a modest percentage of his or
her future income. The Internal Revenue Service would take on a
new role in collecting income-contingent repayments.
Clinton's plan, however, perpetuates existing federal subsidies in
our current guaranteed student loan program, and thereby misses an
opportunity to apply analyses based on intergenerational equity and
lifetime income to reform these subsidies. We currently pay an inter-
est subsidy on behalf of all but high-income families. Once we recog-
nize that the cost of a college education can generally be matched to
its profits, a percentage-of-income repayment cap on student loans is
the only real insurance most graduates need against doing poorly in
note 243, at 334 ("No repayment for a Self-Reliance Loan is required in any year in
which the borrower is not required to file an income tax return."); OBRA Conference
Report, supra note 32, at 467 (same). On the other hand, requiring filing by student loan
borrowers would bring more people into the system, and reduce the Service's general
"nonfiler" problem.
266. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 261.
267. Cf. Hearing on H.R. 2336, supra note 197, at 82 (Statement of Michael S.
Bigelow, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Returns Processing, Internal Revenue Service)
("Based on a review of the payment amounts in the charts accompanying Mr. Petri's bill,
we conclude that many of the delinquent student loan cases would not be assigned a high
enough priority under our current rating system and therefore would receive only routine
attention;" thus, while the cases would receive several notices "and could result in levy
action, they most likely would not be worked by Revenue Officers making personal
contact.").
the job market. Abandoning a broad financial needs test based on
the parents' financial status would free up scarce communal re-
sources to be devoted where they can really make a difference: to
assist those from chronically disadvantaged families.
What can we learn from this governmental lending model? Future
research can examine whether a direct government role could or
should be employed for other major early life cycle expenditures on
human capital - such as child care, health care, and even elemen-
tary and secondary education. For example, if we view the financial
burden of day care (which often falls on young, low-earning fami-
lies) only as one of timing, could we convert our tax expenditures
into loans to working parents that they could repay over many years
through payroll withholding? 268 Besides the policy and administra-
tive questions raised in this article, these other applications would
confront us with the following issues: Do we want an increased fed-
eral role for what have traditionally been considered state or local
decisions?169 Are the amounts involved large enough to bear the
compliance and enforcement costs? How do we deal with the moral
hazard issues that plague even the best insurance schemes, resulting
in inefficient borrowing? How do we ensure that the money we save
on providing services to the middle- and upper-class gets channeled
to helping the truly needy?
268. Cf. Barbara Presley Noble, Financing Strategies for Child Care, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 1993, § 3, at 25 (four states have established child-care loan guarantee funds
- for loans to the care providers, not to the parents) (reviewing RICHARD C. FERLAUTO
ET AL.. CENTER FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES, THE CHILD CARE CREDIT CRUNCH: A SUit-
VEY OF LENDING FOR CHILD CARE FACILITIES (1993)).
269. In particular, were we to "privatize" elementary and secondary schooling,
how would we instill our common democratic values and other training in citizenship?
